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JUSTIFYING ANGLO-AMERICAN TRUSTS LAW
YING KHAI LIEW*
ABSTRACT
Is the existence of trusts law within Anglo-American law
justified? The literature to date does not provide a satisfactory
answer. Situating the doctrinal features of trusts law within the
liberal tradition of political morality, this Article suggests that
trusts law is justified because it enhances personal autonomy in
a unique way. It is comprehensively autonomy-enhancing, with
express, constructive, and resulting trusts each playing a unique
role in achieving this aim. Thus, the law provides a facility for
property owners to unilaterally deal with their own property (express trusts), allows individuals the freedom to enlist others in
their pursuit of their goals (agreement-based constructive trusts),
and ensures that only conclusive choices have long-lasting legal
effects (Re Rose constructive trusts and resulting trusts).
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INTRODUCTION
Is the existence of trusts law within the legal system justified? One would be hard-pressed to find a satisfactory answer in
the available literature to date. Private law theorists have generally
focused their efforts on justifying contract law, tort law, property
law, the law of restitution, and even fiduciary law and equity
(broadly defined), while trusts law has been sidelined.1 On one
view, this is unsurprising, given that those areas of law—and not
trusts law—are features that a mature legal system cannot do
without.2 That is, trusts law is not (to borrow HLA Hart’s words)
a “natural necessity” that provides a “minimum [form] of protection for persons, property, and promises”;3 and (to borrow Randy
E. Barnett’s words) it does not form part of the “background rights
of several property, freedom of contract, first possession, and
restitution [which] are rights that we cannot do without.”4 After
all, numerous fully functioning civilian jurisdictions do not have
trusts law.5 On this view, trusts law is simply an optional extra
that exists for instrumental purposes, and whose existence as
such hardly bears justifying.6
Another reason for which there has been little effort to
justify trusts law might be the lack of appreciation that express,
constructive, and resulting trusts can be treated as a body of law
for that purpose.7 For example, there is a tendency conceptually
MATTHEW HARDING, CHARITY LAW AND THE LIBERAL STATE 2 (2014).
Thus, for example, many civilian legal systems practice those areas of
law but do not recognize the trust.
3 H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 199 (2d ed. 1994).
4 RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE
OF LAW 200 (2d ed. 2014).
5 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625, 670 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian Basis].
6 J.E. Penner, An Untheory of the Law of Trusts, or Some Notes Towards
Understanding the Structure of Trusts Law Doctrine, in 63 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 653, 666 (George Letsas & Colm O’Cinneide eds., 2010). For a further
discussion, see infra note 201.
7 For readers who take the view that charitable trusts are distinct enough
from express trusts such that they ought to be treated as a category of trusts
in their own right, their omission from this Article can be explained on the
basis that charitable trusts are radically different from private express trusts
1
2
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to detach express trusts, which are said to be “intention-based”,
from constructive and resulting trusts, which are said to arise
“by operation of law.” This disconnection tends to affect how we
approach those trusts: instrumentally, in relation to the former;
remedially, in relation to the latter.8 Another example can be
found in the Restatements of the American Law Institute, where
such that the exercise of justifying charitable trusts clearly calls for considerations beyond the scope of those involved in justifying trusts law. As Kathryn
Chan writes:
[D]espite the common association of the law of charitable trusts
with the private law sphere, it is appropriate to regard the common law charities tradition, in a general or categorical sense,
as a true hybrid of public law and private law. The charitable
trust is a public law–private law hybrid in the general sense that
it represents the adaptation of a private law institution to a
variant that is more of a public law nature. While the trust was
specifically designed to enhance the autonomy of propertyowning individuals to formulate and carry out their own projects, the charitable trust was an adaptation of this institution,
whose development reflected the perceived public interest in
the devotion of property to charitable purposes.
KATHRYN CHAN, THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE NATURE OF CHARITY LAW 181 (2016)
(emphasis in original).
That “adaptation” is reflected in the fact that, from a historical perspective,
charitable trusts derived from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and not from the
Chancery courts, and it was simply “a historical accident that the Court of
Chancery hijacked the charitable gift and squeezed it (with some difficulty)
into the pre-existing framework of the trust”. Paul Matthews, The New Trust:
Obligations without Rights?, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 2 (A.J.
Oakley ed., 1996). All this is not to suggest that personal autonomy does not
form part of the justification of charitable trusts, or that charity law cannot
be understood by way of the state’s liberal commitments (for which see generally HARDING, supra note 1). Rather, charitable trusts reflect unique concerns
that call for a unique justification. HARDING, supra note 1, at 1. For example,
it might be said that charity law explicitly raises issues concerning the allocation of state resources, a question that is hardly central to the justification
of private express trusts. See, e.g., HARDING, supra note 1, ch. 3.
On the other hand, the omission of statutory trusts from the scope of this
Article is easily explained: these are instances of the trust being utilized by
the legislature in an instrumental way to achieve particular policy goals,
those goals of which justify their use. They are therefore conceptually different
creatures from trusts as developed in the common law. See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 663.
8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 1 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2001).
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constructive trusts are substantively treated in the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (R3RUE), and divorced from express and resulting trusts which are substantively
treated in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (hereinafter R3T),
on the basis that constructive trusts are merely “remedies” and
are not really “trusts.”9 Further examples can be found in scholarly writings that argue that self-declared express trusts are
conceptually unlike other express trusts;10 that constructive trusts
are not trusts at all;11 and that resulting trusts are essentially
express trusts.12 Underlying all these examples is one common
assumption: that express, constructive, and resulting trusts
share little in common with one another.13 Therefore, the possibility of and need for justifying trusts law in an inclusive manner is
left unaddressed.
But a moment’s thought would reveal that express, constructive, and resulting trusts are not disconnected but interconnected.14
For instance, express trusts that do not exhaust property in the
trustee’s hands trigger resulting trusts for the return of the
property to the settlor or her estate;15 and purported express trusts
that fail to comply with a formality requirement may yet be enforced as constructive trusts.16 Most importantly, trusts (of whatever nature) confer significant rights and powers and impose
stringent duties.17 Why does the law do so, if trusts law is simply
an “optional extra” in the legal system? The existence of trusts
law, as an inclusive body of law, calls for justification.
Id.
See, e.g., Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 675.
11 William Swadling, The Fiction of the Constructive Trust, in 64 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 399, 400 (George Letsas et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Swadling,
Fiction]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55
cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
12 William Swadling, Explaining Resulting Trusts, 116 L.Q. REV. 72 (2008)
[hereinafter Swadling, Explaining]; AMY MORRIS HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 454 (2019) [hereinafter HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S
TRUSTS] approximates to this position.
13 See Swadling, Fiction, supra note 11, at 399.
14 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 1 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2001).
15 See id. § 7 cmt. b.
16 Id. § 8 cmt. h.
17 See id. § 2.
9

10
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This Article attempts to answer that call. Situating the
doctrinal features of trusts law within the liberal tradition of
political morality, it suggests that a convincing justification can be
found: the existence of trusts law is justified because it enhances
personal autonomy in a unique way.18 To begin with, Part I of
this Article does two things. First, it presents a (necessarily brief)
sketch of how autonomy features within a particular conception
of liberalism.19 Secondly, it provides an overview of how trusts
law can be situated within that conception of liberalism, noting
four lines of enquiry that arise for consideration, which form the
basis of the discussion that follows.20 Parts II–IV then flesh out
the details of how express, (some) constructive, and resulting
trusts enhance autonomy, with each Part dealing with one type
of trust respectively.21 As this Article covers Anglo-American22
trusts law, some doctrinal ground-clearing exercise will precede
the autonomy discussion where the trusts laws in these jurisdictions ostensibly differ.23 In Part V, the proposed justification is
strengthened by defending it against two possible counterarguments.24 Part VI reflects on three ways that the analysis may
further our understanding of trusts law.25 This Article concludes
in the final two paragraphs.
18 To be sure, this Article does not deal with every single trusts law rule.
Nor does it claim that every trusts law rule enhances personal autonomy: as
will be seen, certain rules place external limits on settlor autonomy. Rather,
the aim of this Article is to justify the existence of trusts law: its central point
is that trust law’s availability enhances autonomy in a unique way. Naturally,
therefore, many of the rules discussed concern the creation of express trusts,
or the circumstances in which the law deems constructive and resulting
trusts to arise. This Article is less concerned with the rules that, for example,
come into play during the ongoing life of an express trust or the termination
of trusts.
19 See infra Section I.A.
20 See infra Section I.B.
21 See infra Parts II–IV.
22 Trusts law in America is not part of federal law but a matter for state
law, and therefore there are variations between states in relation to trusts
law rules. In this Article, “American” trusts law is generally taken to be that
which is reflected in the R3T and R3RUE. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
23 See infra Section IV.A.
24 See infra Part V.
25 See infra Part VI.
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I.AUTONOMY-BASED LIBERALISM
A. Two Responses to Value Pluralism
The liberal tradition of political morality has generated a
rich diversity of perspectives.26 Underlying most of these perspectives lies the recognition of value pluralism.27 This is the idea
that there exists many equally valuable yet distinct forms of life
that are incompatible or incommensurable inter se, in that they
cannot all be realized within the lifetime of any single person or
society.28 This insight has engendered two main responses from
liberals, namely “political” and “comprehensive” liberalism,29 each
of which entails a different conception of the role of the state
within a liberal polity.30
Political liberalism takes value pluralism as a given—a
background fact that must first be accepted—from which any
argument concerning the role of the state proceeds.31 Dealing
with that background fact through the liberal prisms of equality
and toleration, political liberalism argues that the state’s proper
Jeremy Waldron, Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive, in HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL THEORY 89, 91 (Gerald F. Gaus & Chandran Kukathas eds., 2004).
“[L]iberalism” itself is not the name of a determinate set of
social and political commitments. There are certain core positions and the various schools of liberal thought that may have
a family resemblance to one another. But in many areas they
offer rival conceptions of the values that are characteristically
associated with liberalism, like liberty, equality, democracy,
toleration, and the rule of law.
Id.
27 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 133 (1986) [hereinafter RAZ,
MORALITY].
28 Id.; JOSEPH RAZ, THE PRACTICE OF VALUE 43 (2003); Isaiah Berlin, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN: LIBERTY 216 (Henry Hardy ed., 1969).
29 See generally Waldron, supra note 26; Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism,
Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV. 385, 385–86 (1996). This
distinction is necessarily a rough-and-ready one; as Gerald F. Gaus argues,
the diversity of liberal views may mean that it is more accurate to speak of a
spectrum of perspectives rather than opposing ones. The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 26, at 89,
91. However, the rough-and-ready distinction serves as important checkpoints
along the spectrum, against which trusts law can be compared or contrasted.
30 See Waldron, supra note 26, at 91.
31 See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 132–33.
26
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role is one of non-interference or neutrality32: it must not assert
any influence concerning incompatible forms of the morally good
life, so that no one particular value is preferred over another.33
As John Rawls describes it, “[p]olitical liberalism ... aims for a
political conception of justice as a freestanding view.”34 Through
maintaining state neutrality, the argument goes, the liberty of
individuals is enhanced, since they each have the freedom to
choose their own form of life free from systemic interference.35
In contrast, comprehensive liberalism “maintains that it
is impossible adequately to defend or elaborate liberal commitments except by invoking the deeper values and commitments
associated with some overall or ‘comprehensive’ philosophy.”36 It
does not approach value pluralism in the disengaged way of the
political liberalist, but takes the view that liberty is fundamentally affected by how people come to endorse one form of life over
others within a pluralist society.37 Because a liberal society is
one where forms of the good life are chosen freely, that is, through
the exercise of maximal and meaningful personal autonomy, comprehensive liberalism argues that the state has a positive duty to
promote and protect personal autonomy in order to achieve the
ideals of a liberal society.38 Certainly, the state must maintain a
neutral stance in relation to the different morally good and incompatible forms of life.39 However, an autonomous life is not
taken to be one of the forms of life available to be chosen; rather,
autonomy has a “second-order”40 or “derivative”41 value: it is “not
an independent ... ideal” that is separable from the multitude of
See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 26, at 92; Gardbaum, supra note 29, at
385–86; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11
(1980); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xix (1993); BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE
AS IMPARTIALITY (1995).
33 Waldron, supra note 26, at 92.
34 RAWLS, supra note 32, at 10; see also CHARLES LARMORE, THE MORALS
OF MODERNITY 125 (1996); Gardbaum, supra note 29, at 386.
35 See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 130.
36 Waldron, supra note 26, at 91.
37 Id. at 91.
38 See Gardbaum, supra note 29, at 401.
39 Id. at 385–86.
40 Id. at 394.
41 HARDING, supra note 1, at 53.
32
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valuable forms of life available to be chosen.42 That is, autonomy
facilitates choice; it is not one of the subject matters of that exercise of choice.43 Therefore, the state has the duty to promote and
protect personal autonomy, and this requires attention to be paid
to the three “conditions of autonomy,” as Joseph Raz has famously
argued,44 namely: individual capabilities, an adequate range of
options, and independence (freedom from coercion and manipulation).45 Indeed, for Raz, states that fail “to provide the conditions
of autonomy” for its citizens cause harm to them.46 For Gardbaum,
the reasons why the state’s positive duty is so extensive is that
“coercion is not the only factor that can undermine autonomy,”
and that the state “may sometimes be the only actor capable of
countering constraints on autonomy generated in and by society.”47
B. Trusts Law as Autonomy-Enhancing: An Overview
For the purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to engage
in a debate, as a matter of legal philosophy, as to which conception of liberalism is superior. It is sufficient to identify the conception that provides the best fit for this Article’s task of justifying
trusts law.
Political liberalism does not provide a good fit, mainly because state inaction struggles to explain the continued availability of trusts law.48 Unlike other areas of (mainly private) law, it
is not immediately obvious that trusts law is fundamentally
necessary: personal autonomy is neither completely destroyed nor
significantly deprived in the absence of trusts law since other
areas of law such as contracts, wills, and property remain available for individuals to enter into meaningful legal relations with
others.49 At best, trusts law has an enhancing potential, in that it
allows people to form more complex and sophisticated legal relations
RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 395.
Id.
44 Id. at 372.
45 Id. at 372.
46 Id. at 415–16 (modifying J.S. Mill’s famous “harm principle”).
47 Gardbaum, supra note 29, at 401.
48 See Penner, supra note 6, at 671, 674.
49 See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 670.
42
43
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with others.50 It is difficult to explain the state’s effort of making
available, maintaining, enforcing, and improving trusts law with
a conception of the state as being noninterventionist.51
In contrast, comprehensive liberalism allows trusts law to
be understood as the consequence of a positive effort on the part
of the state to promote personal autonomy.52 Most obviously, personal autonomy is enhanced where trusts law increases property
owners’ range of options for dealing with their own property,
thereby providing an additional facility they may utilize to attain
their personal aims and goals.53 Trusts law also secures personal
autonomy where it allows individuals to enlist others to achieve
their goals and ends, as well as where it ensures that only decisive decisions give rise to legally significant consequences.54
The bulk of the discussion that follows explains how express, (some) constructive, and resulting trusts in Anglo-American
law can be justified in terms of enhancing personal autonomy.
To do so, it will be necessary to undertake four lines of enquiry.
The first is the most fundamental and straightforward one,
which is to explain the role of each type of trust in protecting and
enhancing personal autonomy.
The second can be termed inward-looking safeguards.55 A
commitment to enhancing personal autonomy requires that legal consequences should not obtain in circumstances that do not
call for them, for example, in the absence of a decisive decision on
the part of property owners.56 If the law enforced decisions reached
on a whim, it would detract from the aim of enhancing autonomy:
“[p]roviding, preserving or protecting bad options does not enable
one to enjoy valuable autonomy.”57 So the second line of enquiry
See id. at 643.
See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
52 See Waldron, supra note 26, at 91.
53 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 2 cmts. c, d (AM. L. INST. 2001).
54 See id. § 2 cmt. b.
55 For a further discussion, see infra Section II.B.
56 RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 391.
57 Id. at 412. Or, more elaborately, Dori Kimel writes, in the context of
promises:
When someone promises willy-nilly, makes promises that it is
not in her interests to make, or makes promises to the wrong
people or at the wrong time (etc.), she may be authoring more
50
51
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explores the extent to which trusts law safeguards people’s exercise
of autonomy, such that only meaningful ones have legal effects.
The third can be termed outward-looking safeguards.58
Trusts always involve at least two parties; one cannot simultaneously be the sole trustee and sole beneficiary.59 Trusts are
therefore always relationships.60 The relational aspect reveals
that trusts law not only enables property owners to exercise their
own autonomy, but also empowers certain actors within a trust
by granting them rights and powers over others.61 Since it is a
liberal principle that everyone should be granted equal access to
personal autonomy, it is necessary that trusts law should sanction the exercise of autonomy only if it does not excessively intrude upon the autonomy of others.62 Therefore, the third line of
enquiry explores how trusts law ensures that a proper balance
between the autonomy of different parties is struck.
The fourth line of enquiry can be termed external limits. “In
autonomy-based liberalism, autonomy is the core value but it is not
the only value, nor is it the ultimate value.”63 Thus, other considerations lying beyond the scope of autonomy might validly constrain
the autonomy-enhancing function of trusts law in appropriate
of her own obligations, but authoring them badly—and, most
likely, “badly” precisely in the relevant sense: to the detriment of
her personal autonomy .... Personal autonomy in general depends
for its value on the worthiness of its exercise, and its exercise
through promising may be more or less worthy. The capacity
to self-author obligations to others may be of great value, autonomy-wise and otherwise; but like most other capacities, it
can be used and it can be misused, and it can indeed be misused in a way that undermines the very goals that (when
used prudently) it is particularly suitable for promoting.
Dori Kimel, Personal Autonomy and Change of Mind in Promise and in Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 96, 98 (Gregory
Klass et al. eds., 2014) (citation omitted).
58 For a further discussion, see infra Section II.C.
59 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 70 (AM. L. INST. 2001).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy and Pluralism in Private Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW 177, 191 (Andrew Gold et al. eds.,
2020) (explaining this notion is rooted in the concept of “relational justice”—that
private law is “premised on the right to reciprocal respect for self-determination”).
63 HARDING, supra note 1, at 52.
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situations.64 Some of these considerations may be legal ones—for
example, property law considerations, such as pre-existing categories of recognized property interests; others may be non-legal—for
example, economic or public policy considerations.65 The mere fact
that these external considerations may limit the workings of
trusts law does not detract from its autonomy-enhancing justification: their existence simply reveals that trusts law does not
exist in a vacuum but operates within a complex framework that
also contains other legal, economic, social, etc. norms. But trusts
law’s commitment to personal autonomy also suggests that external constraints on autonomy ought to be the exception rather
than the norm. The fourth line of enquiry, therefore, identifies
potential factors that act as external limits on trusts law, and
assesses whether their intrusion on personal autonomy is appropriately circumscribed.
II.EXPRESS TRUSTS
A. The Role of Express Trusts in Enhancing Autonomy
The express trust is an “amenity”66—a facilitative device
made available for people to “realis[e] their wishes, by conferring
legal powers upon them to create, by certain specified procedures
and subject to certain conditions, structures of rights and duties
within the coercive framework of the law.”67 The availability of
the express trusts facility goes a long way towards attaining one
of Raz’s three conditions of autonomy, namely securing an adequate range of options to individuals.68
This point can be understood from two perspectives. First,
when viewed alongside other devices such as contracts, wills, and
property, express trusts add to the range of facilities individuals
may choose to utilize towards achieving their desired goals.69
Consider Bernard Rudden’s famous description of an express
See id.
See id.
66 HART, supra note 3, at 96.
67 Id. at 27–28.
68 See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 373.
69 See id.; Michael Bryan, The Inferred Trust: An Unhappy Marriage of
Contract and Trust?, in 69 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 377, 378 (Piet Eeckhout
et al. eds., 2016).
64
65
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trust as “a gift, projected on the plane of time and so subjected to
a management regime.”70 This brings out the unique, distinctive
option presented by the express trust: it is neither a mere gift
(replicable by property law), nor merely a promise to make a gift
in the future (replicable by wills or contracts), nor a mere management arrangement (replicable by contracts), but provides the
potential for bundling up these features all in one.71 Indeed,
many other well-rehearsed features of express trusts, for example,
that trust assets are “bankruptcy remote,”72 that misappropriated
trust assets are traceable against third parties,73 and that a comprehensive default regime regulates trustee duties and beneficiary rights,74 significantly increase the distinctiveness of express
trusts as a facilitative device as compared to other facilities
available within the law.75
Secondly, when viewed from an internal perspective, the
inherent flexibility provided for by the express trust structure
opens up a world of options for property owners, securing for
them “the greatest possible freedom as to how [they] may intentionally give [their property] away.”76 To borrow Raz’s words,
express trusts may be set up with “long term pervasive consequences” such as dynastic, pensions, or investment trusts; with
“short term options of little consequence,” such as a simple bare
trust or short term trust; or with consequences that represent a
“fair spread in between.”77
Express trusts go far beyond the simple provision of a passive framework by which property owners “can organise [their] relations with others”78: they also provide an extensive set of default
Bernard Rudden, Book Review, 44 MOD. L. REV. 610 (1981).
See id.; Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 627–28.
72 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23 (1996);
John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997) [hereinafter Langbein, Secret Life].
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59 (AM.
L. INST. 2010).
74 Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 627.
75 See Bryan, supra note 69, at 378–79.
76 SIMON GARDNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.2 (3d ed.
2011).
77 RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 374.
78 J.E. Penner, The (True) Nature of a Beneficiary’s Equitable Proprietary
Interest Under a Trust, 27 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 473, 494 n.53 (2014).
70
71
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rules79 that enhance settlor autonomy in a different way. If express
trusts merely provided a blank slate for property owners to engraft
their own intentions, then that facility would not provide a very
meaningful choice after all: settlors “would not only have to consider
the transaction costs of constructing [the rules that govern the trust
relationship] from scratch; they would also face ‘obstacles of the
imagination’ just coming up with the options in the first place.”80
Moreover, given the inherent ascendancy of the trustee and vulnerability of the beneficiary, creating an express trust would hardly
be a risk worth taking if the beneficiary’s position were protected
only by those provisions expressly provided for by the settlor at the
outset.81 The default rules of express trusts, therefore, serve to
secure another condition of autonomy, namely individual capabilities: they do so by easing the burden of financial, human, and
legal limitations that may inhibit meaningful engagement with the
express trust device.82 At the same time, default rules do not encroach into settlors’ freedom to self-determine, as they can easily
be overridden through provisions in the trust instrument.83
This straightforward analysis might, however, face the
charge of being too simplistic. Skeptics might argue that there are
These include (but are not limited to) fiduciary duties, duties of investment, the duty to adhere to the terms of the trust, the duty to account, and
the duty of care.
80 Dagan, supra note 62, at 185.
81 See id.; see also Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 630 (2004) (“Langbein's analysis implies that trust
law’s role is to offer a set of standardized terms that minimize transaction costs
for the deal between the settlor and the trustee. By invoking the law of trusts,
the settlor and the trustee need only record the extent to which their deal deviates from the default governance regime. This view has two important
normative implications. First, trust law's default governance regime, including
most critically the fiduciary obligation of the trustee to the beneficiaries, should
reflect the terms for which the parties would likely have bargained with low negotiation costs and full information.” (internal citations omitted)); Barry R. Furrow,
Patient Safety and the Fiduciary Hospital: Sharpening Judicial Remedies, 1
DREXEL L. REV. 439, 444 (2009) (“Trusts are classic situational vulnerabilities, in
which the beneficiary is vulnerable to the trustee's power and prudence.”).
82 Sitkoff, supra note 81, at 630.
83 For an exploration on the limits of a settlor’s usual freedom to abrogate
default rules see John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 1105 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules] (“The law
of trusts consists overwhelmingly of default rules that the settlor who creates
the trust may alter or negate. There are, however, some mandatory rules, which
the settlor is forbidden to vary.”).
79
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features within express trusts that point away from an autonomybased analysis.84 To anticipate this charge, the discussion now turns
to addressing four grounds upon which a skeptical argument might
be built.
1. Unilateral vs. Bilateral Intention
Implicit in the autonomy-based analysis above is the orthodox approach that express trusts respond to the unilateral declaration of trust of a property owner (as settlor).85 However, this
conventional approach has come under attack, both in England86
and in America87 for not sufficiently recognizing the trustee’s role in
the creation of some express trusts.88 For example, John Langbein
argues that express trusts—excluding self-declared ones—are “functionally indistinguishable from the modern third-party-beneficiary
contract,” and therefore he proposes that the “contractarian” basis of
the trust should be recognized as such.89 He finds support for his
argument that the trust is a voluntary consensual “deal” representing a “bargain about how the trust assets are to be managed and
distributed”90 on the grounds that “[n]o one can be made to accept a
trusteeship.”91 Man Yip takes a different approach to the same end
by arguing that the proliferation of trusts arising from commercial
contracts means that it is now more meaningful to speak of trusts
arising in response to bilateral rather than unilateral intention.92
The distinction between unilateral and bilateral intention
matters because it affects how express trusts are understood from
an autonomy perspective. If the orthodox approach holds good, then
the express trust enhances settlor autonomy: it provides a facility
for property owners unilaterally to decide how their own property
See, e.g., Man Yip, The Commercial Context in Trust Law, 5 CONV. &
PROP. L. 347 (2016); GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND TRUSTS
42–44 (2012).
85 Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 652; see supra Section II.A.
86 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 84.
87 Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 627.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 650.
92 Yip, supra note 84, at 351–52. This proposition finds some support in the
Australian High Court case of Korda v Australian Ex’r Trs (SA) Ltd (2015)
255 CLR 62, ¶¶ 40, 136 (Austl.).
84
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should be dealt with. Conversely, if (some) express trusts respond to
bilateral intentions, then those trusts provide a facility for the enforcement of promises, just as contracts do.93 On this approach, an
express trust is binding only because the parties have “intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds ... for
another to expect the promised performance.”94
There is good reason to reject the bilateral intention approach. While Langbein is right to say that trustees can disclaim
trusteeship and thus in a sense the trustee’s consent is required,95 she is strictly limited to accepting or rejecting the office
of trusteeship: she has no legal power to amend the trust terms
that the settlor unilaterally intended.96 Furthermore, it is trite that
express trusts “can be created without notice to or acceptance by
any beneficiary or trustee.”97 Together, these rules indicate that
express trusts serve first and foremost to make available choices
to settlors as property owners, thereby enhancing their personal autonomy, and it is much less concerned with securing the trustee’s
exercise of autonomy, except in the negative sense of providing
outward-looking safeguards, as discussed later below.
Certainly, in contractual settings it will often be the case
that the settlor’s unilateral intention to create a trust corresponds
precisely to the trustee’s intention to hold on trust.98 However,
that is a matter of coincidence, and trusts law’s primary focus on
See Yip, supra note 84, at 351–52.
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 16 (2d ed. 2015); see also RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 175
(stating that a promisee “has an interest that promises made to him will be
kept ... invariably he has a pro tanto interest that promises given to him be
kept”); Dagan, supra note 62, at 182 (stating that contract law ensures “the
reliability of contractual promises for future performance”).
95 See infra text accompanying notes 198–207.
96 See A v. A [2007] EWHC (Fam) 99, [42]–[43] (Eng.) (“Once a trust has
been properly constituted ... the property cannot lose its character as trust
property save in accordance with the terms of the trust itself.”). Langbein
overlooks this point and over-emphasizes the consensual nature of trusteeship. See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 675 n.246.
97 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 14 (AM. L. INST. 2001). English authorities include Jones v. Jones [1874] WN 190 (Eng.); Harris v. Sharp (1989)
[2003] WTLR 1541 at 1549 (Eng.); Tate v. Leithead (1854) Kay 658 at 65; 69
ER 279 (Eng.); Bill v. Cureton (1835) 2 MY. & K. 503 at 507 (Eng.); 39 ER
1036; Standing v. Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282 at 283 (Eng.); Naas v. Nat’l
Westminster Bank [1940] AC 366 at 375 (Eng.).
98 Bryan, supra note 69, at 379.
93
94
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settlor autonomy should not be confused with contract law’s
general concern with bilateral autonomy.99 As Michael Bryan has
helpfully explained, where a contract is ambiguous and a question of interpretation arises, courts might reach radically different outcomes depending on whether a “contract law perspective” or
a “trusts law perspective” is adopted.100 The different autonomyenhancing work of express trusts and contracts law are best
advanced by keeping separate these devices and their approaches
to ascertaining intention.101
2. Informal Trusts
In England, as in most states in America, the validity or
enforcement of some inter vivos and testamentary trusts are made
conditional upon the fulfilment of certain statutory formality requirements.102 In line with the R3T, these statutes will be identified in this Article as “Statute of Frauds” and “Wills Acts.”103
“Statute of Frauds” refers to formality provisions enacted in reference to Section 7 of the (English) Statute of Frauds 1677, which
required inter vivos trusts concerning interests in land to be proved
in signed writing.104 “Wills Acts” refers to formality provisions
required for a will to be validly executed.105
Sometimes, however, courts also enforce informally declared
trusts, such as secret trusts.106 In America, it is clear that the lack
of compliance with the necessary formality requirements means
Id. at 379.
Id. at 379. Cf. Yip, supra note 84, at 347.
101 Bryan, supra note 69, at 1–3.
102 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 2 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001);
The Law of Property Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 20, § 53(1)(b).
103 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. §§ 1, 22 (AM. L. INST. 2001); HESS ET AL.,
BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 101.
104 In England, the provision is now found in The Law of Property Act
1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 20, § 53(1)(b). In America, most states have enacted
similar provisions, although in a minority of states the writing requirement
has either been extended to cover other types of property or abolished altogether. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 2 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001).
105 In England, these provisions are found in The Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4
& 1 Vict. c. 26, § 9. In America, each state has a respective Wills Act. See
HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 101.
106 McCormick v. Grogan (1869) 4 LR (HL) 82 at 86 (appeal taken from
Eng.); Blackwell v. Blackwell [1929] AC (HL) 318 at 334 (appeal taken from
Eng.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 18 (AM. L. INST. 2001).
99
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that they are not enforced as express trusts, but as constructive
trusts that rest on the basis of a different rationale.107 In England,
however, the nature of the trust remains debated.108 Arguments
have been advanced that informal trusts may be enforced directly
as express trusts because the formality requirements are simply one
of the means of proving express trusts;109 and, therefore, they can
be disapplied by courts, paving the way for an informal trust to
be enforced as an express trust, its existence being proven by oral
evidence.110 On this view, “express” within the phrase “express
trust” simply means “declared.”111
The American approach is to be preferred for a number of important reasons. As a matter of positive law, a long line of English
cases have enforced informally declared trusts as constructive
trusts.112 Even more importantly, the constructive trust approach
is the only approach consistent with the autonomy-enhancing function of express trusts.113 As will be discussed below, formalities
serve as an inward-looking safeguard to settlor autonomy, and so it
is dangerous to suggest that they can simply be disapplied by
the courts.114
Moreover, there is good reason to confine the use of the
phrase “express trust” only to identify trust arrangements that
are enforced due to the successful exercise of a property owner’s
autonomy to create a trust relationship, as opposed to a looser usage
of that phrase to include nonsuccessful exercises of unilateral
choice. Only then can express trusts be understood to have a distinct
107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 46
cmt. g, 55 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010); HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note
12, §§ 497–501. That rationale is ostensibly the prevention of unjust enrichment,
but this is doubted below at Section III.A.2.
108 See 1 LEWIN ON TRUSTS ¶ 3-080 (Lynton Tucker et al. eds., 20th ed. 2020).
109 See generally, e.g., Paul Matthews, The Words Which Are Not There: A Partial History of the Constructive Trust, in CONSTRUCTIVE AND RESULTING TRUSTS
(Charles Mitchell ed., 2010); William Swadling, The Nature of the Trust in
Rochefoucauld v. Boustead, in CONSTRUCTIVE AND RESULTING TRUSTS, supra, at
95; William Swadling, Substance and Procedure in Equity, 10 J. EQUITY 1 (2016)
[hereinafter Swadling, Substance and Procedure]; see also Swadling, Fiction,
supra note 11, at 417–18.
110 See Swadling, Substance and Procedure, supra note 109, at 7–8.
111 Id. at 6.
112 See YING KHAI LIEW, RATIONALISING CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS 38 n.9, 92
nn.131–32 (2017) [hereinafter LIEW, RATIONALISING].
113 For further support of this view, see infra Sections III.A, IV.A.
114 See infra Section II.B.
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role to play in enhancing personal autonomy.115 To take but one
example, in both America and England, courts do not enforce informal inter vivos self-declared trusts, that is, where a property
owner declares herself as trustee for another, but does not comply
with a relevant formality requirement.116 If informal trusts were
enforced as express trusts, then the non-enforcement of these
informal self-declared trusts would provide reason to criticize the
law for depriving settlors of their personal autonomy.117 Conversely,
refusing to enforce informal trusts as express trusts sends a clear
message: that there has been an unsuccessful unilateral engagement with the express trust facility, but nevertheless there may be
other grounds—those that provide the basis of some constructive
trusts, as discussed further below—upon which the informal arrangement may be enforced.118 The non-enforcement of informal
self-declared trusts can then properly be understood as an inwardlooking safeguard, a point taken up later in the discussion.119
3. The Rule in Saunders v. Vautier
It is well-known that English and American law differs on
the applicability of the “rule in Saunders v. Vautier.”120 According
to this rule, a beneficiary who is (or beneficiaries who together are)
sui juris and absolutely entitled to the beneficial interest under a
trust may terminate the trust and compel the trustee to convey
the trust property to the beneficiary even if the trust instrument
attempts to postpone distribution of the property.121 While this
See infra Section II.B.
England: Smith v. Matthews (1861) 3 De G.F. & J. 139 at 153–55, 45
Eng. Rep. 831 (Eng.); America: RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 24(4) (AM. L.
INST. 2001).
117 Nili Cohen, The Betrayed(?) Wills of Kafka and Brod, 27 L. & LIT. 1, 7
(2015) (“This formal position, which gives precedence to the formal legal requirements and to the principles of certainty and stability, could certainly serve
as grounds for Kafka’s ambivalence regarding the law. Rather ironically, a
situation where a testator’s intention is not fulfilled because of a failure to meet a
formal requirement may sometimes be called Kafkaesque: this stark gap between
the individual’s autonomy and the state’s dictates highlights the law’s inaccessibility to its addressees one of its most problematic aspects; its gates are arbitrarily
locked to those who sincerely wish to enter and find within it shelter and refuge.”).
118 See id.; see also infra Section III.C.
119 See infra Section III.C.
120 Saunders v. Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Eng.).
121 See id.
115
116
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rule remains applicable in England, most American states have
followed the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Claflin v. Claflin122 in holding that the rule in Saunders
does not apply, and that postponing terms are valid.123
This difference is often presented as a “clash” of perspectives of autonomy.124 For example, Graham Moffatt writes that
it touches on:
a basic paradox at the heart of a property system operating
within the tenets of liberalism: where a donor of an interest
tries to restrict a donee’s freedom to dispose of that interest, then
the legal system must choose between competing freedoms, that
of the donor or that of the donee.125

Gregory S. Alexander likewise writes that it calls for “a choice between state recognition of the ‘autonomy’ of the transferor and that
of the recipient.”126 The premise of this analysis is that there is a
trade-off between the autonomy of the settlor and that of the
beneficiary: enhancing the autonomy of one curbs the autonomy
of the other.127 Thus, autonomy is curbed in English law128 and
enhanced in American law.129
However, this is too crude a way of looking at things, when in
truth both regimes are autonomy-enhancing.
20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
Id. at 456; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 65 (AM. L. INST. 2001) (describing the Claflin rule as the “prevalent American view”).
124 See generally Richard R. Powell, Freedom of Alienation—For Whom—The
Clash of Theories, 2 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 127 (1967).
125 Graham Moffatt, Trusts Law: A Song Without End, 55 MOD. L. REV.
123, 129 (1992).
126 Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the
Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1241 (1985).
127 See id. at 1236–41.
128 Goulding v. James [1997] 2 All ER 239, 247 (Eng.) (“The [Saunders] principle recognises the rights of beneficiaries, who are sui juris and together absolutely
entitled to the trust property, to exercise their proprietary rights to overbear and
defeat the intention of a testator or settlor to subject property to the continuing
trusts, powers and limitations of a will or trust instrument.”); see also John H.
Langbein, Why the Rule in Saunders v. Vautier Is Wrong, in EQUITY AND
ADMINISTRATION 189, 196 (P.G. Turner ed., 2016) [hereinafter Langbein, The
Rule in Saunders].
129 Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889) (“[A settlor’s] intentions
ought to be carried out unless they contravene some positive rule of law, or
are against public policy.”).
122
123
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It is first necessary to recall that intention is ascertained
objectively in private law, and so whether a property owner has
successfully utilized the facilitative device of the express trust is
a matter to be determined objectively.130 One expression of this
objective approach is found in the fact that a person’s (subjective)
words and actions are assessed against a background of pre-existing
(objective) legal categories of case, and the legal consequence of
her words and actions is determined by the category of case to
which those words and actions most closely approximate.131 To
take one example, in the celebrated English case of Barclays Bank
Ltd v. Quistclose Investments Ltd,132 the legal effect of a lender’s
(subjective) intention to lend money to the borrower for an “exclusive” purpose was assessed against the pre-existing legal categories
of “contract” and “trust”; and in holding that a trust was objectively intended, the House of Lords effectively determined that
the lender’s intention most closely approximated an intention to
create a trust rather than simply to enter into a contract.133
For present purposes, pre-existing categories of recognized
property interests134 provides another background legal framework against which an individual’s exercise of autonomy to create
an express trust is measured.135 In England, “absolute interest”
130 Ying Khai Liew, ‘Sham Trusts’ and Ascertaining Intentions to Create a
Trust, 12 J. EQUITY 237, 245–46 (2018) [hereinafter Liew, Sham Trusts].
131 See id. at 239–40. This process is often described as an exercise of “construction,” although that term tends to obscure the precise interaction between
an individual’s exercise of autonomy and the pre-existing background rules
against which it is assessed.
132 [1970] AC 567.
133 Id. at 576.
134 The pre-existing framework of recognized property interests reflects the
numerus clausus principle, which provides that there is an exhaustive list of
recognized property rights. It has been argued that the principle is underpinned by
economic and practical considerations. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 3 (2001); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002); Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 296 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith
eds., 2011).
135 See supra Section I.B.
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and “contingent interest” are neighboring categories; no finer
intermediate category is recognized.136 This is because English
law requires “equitable ownership” to include “every component
of ownership.”137 On the other hand, American law recognizes the
intermediate category of a “restricted absolute interest”: a property right can exist without the power to alienate the capital.138
Such an interest is acceptable because in American law the notion does not offend “any concept of a minimal core content to
beneficiary property.”139
These differences are instructive for understanding the rule
in Saunders v. Vautier.140 In America, a postponing term creates
a “restricted absolute interest,” falling squarely within the recognized intermediate category of property interests, and is therefore
enforceable in line with Claflin.141 On the other hand, since that
category of property interest is unavailable in English law, the
courts in construing such a trust term would have to approximate
the settlor’s intention either to an intention to create an absolute
interest or a contingent interest.142 As Paul Matthews writes:
What will the English court do? It must decide what was the
settlor’s intention, as expressed in the trust terms. It will take
full account of the postponement clause, suggesting that the gift
was intended to be contingent. But if, ultimately, the court is
satisfied that the settlor’s intention was not to create a contingent trust, but to give the entire beneficial interest immediately to the beneficiary, it will disregard the postponement
clause, because it is repugnant to the settlor’s intention.143

136 Paul Matthews, Why the Rule in Saunders v. Vautier Is Wrong: A
Commentary, in EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 128, at 205, at 203,
208–09 [hereinafter Matthews, Saunders Commentary].
137 Langbein, The Rule in Saunders, supra note 128, at 191.
138 Joshua Getzler, Transplantation and Mutation in Anglo-American Trust
Law, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 355, 360 (2009) [hereinafter Getzler,
Transplantation]. Or, in the words of Justice Miller in the 1875 U.S. Supreme
Court decision of Nichols v. Eaton, “[w]e do not see ... that the power of alienation is a necessary incident to a life-estate in real property[.]” 91 U.S. 716,
725 (1875).
139 Getzler, Transplantation, supra note 138, at 375.
140 See Saunders v. Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115.
141 See Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 455–56 (Mass. 1889).
142 See Matthews, Saunders Commentary, supra note 136, at 205.
143 Id.
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Understood in this way, the English approach is also autonomy-enhancing, for it demonstrates that the courts strive—as
best as possible, against the background framework of legal rules—
to give full effect to the settlor’s choice.144 This analysis also
demonstrates that the root of the conflict between the English
and American approaches lies outside trusts law: the question of
whether the pre-existing categories of recognized property interests are too narrow or too wide involves “broad considerations of
policy,”145 to which the facilitative rules of the express trust
have little to add.146 Disentangling the express trust rules from
those debates over “background rules” allows us to appreciate
express trusts—even with the rule in Saunders v. Vautier as a
live issue147—as autonomy-enhancing.148
4. Irreducible Core Content of Trusts
As part of their freedom to dictate the terms of the trust,
settlors are generally free to provide for the ouster of trustee duties
or to exempt trustees from liability for breaches.149 But in England,
that freedom is subject to the non-violation of what Millett LJ
termed the “irreducible core of obligations” in Armitage v Nurse.150
In his words:
[T]here is an irreducible core of obligations owed by the trustees to the beneficiaries and enforceable by them which is
fundamental to the concept of a trust ... The duty of the trustees

See id.
Langbein, Secret Life, supra note 72, at 198 (quoting A.W. SCOTT & W.F.
FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 337.3 (4th ed. 1989)).
146 See Matthews, Saunders Commentary, supra note 136, at 205–07.
147 In the majority of modern trusts today, the rule in Saunders v. Vautier
at best provides a “theoretical” right, since, for a variety of practical reasons,
beneficiaries cannot or will not exercise the right to collapse the trust and take
the trust property. These include drafting strategies; open-ended beneficiary
classes; beneficiaries not fulfilling the sui juris requirement; tax considerations; and so on. See Langbein, The Rule in Saunders, supra note 128, at 202.
148 See generally id.
149 See Matthews, Saunders Commentary, supra note 136, at 205.
150 [1998] Ch 241. In America, the position is unclear. See David Ramos
Muñoz, Can Complex Contracts Effectively Replace Bankruptcy Principles?:
Why Interpretation Matters, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 417, 437–38 (2018).
144
145
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to perform the trusts honestly and in good faith for the benefit
of the beneficiaries is the minimum necessary ....151

On this analysis, any clause that purports to exempt trustees from dishonest or bad faith breaches is of no effect.152 This
has recently led Sir Philip Sales to suggest, extrajudicially, that
this rule unduly fetters settlor autonomy.153 He asks, rhetorically:
“trusts law is usually taken to be governed by a dominant principle of full autonomy on the part the settlor—a sort of ‘freedom
of trust’ to match ‘freedom of contract’. From this angle ... is Millett
LJ’s statement perhaps not generous enough?”154
Quite the contrary. It is difficult to accept that a legal facility enhances personal autonomy if the law allows those who
choose to make use of that facility to also negate or destroy the
facility’s structural features in the process. A purported contract
the essence of which is that one “does not promise to” do something can hardly be a binding contract; a purported will that purports to dispose property inter vivos is hardly a will. Similarly, a
purported trust that makes no room for trustees to be subjected
to meaningful duties can hardly be recognized as a trust,155
since it attempts to remove the relational aspect of what makes
a trust a trust. “If the beneficiaries have no rights enforceable
against the trustees there are no trusts.”156 This is not to deny
that such an arrangement may still be enforced as a contract,
thereby engaging the autonomy-enhancing function of contracts
law.157 The point is, however, that maintaining an irreducible
core of a trust is crucial to ensuring that express trusts are able to
Armitage v. Nurse [1998] Ch 241 at 253 (Eng.).
See id. at 253–55.
153 See Philip Sales, Exemption Clauses in Trusts, in DEFENCES IN EQUITY
121, 123 (Paul S. Davies et al. eds., 2018).
154 Id. at 125.
155 David Hayton, The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship, in TRENDS
IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW, supra note 7, at 47; see also Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 83, at 1121–23. Another example is “illusory trusts,”
where settlors ostensibly divest their property on trust, but the courts hold that
they retain full control of the property in substance. See, e.g., Clayton v. Clayton
[2016] NZSC 29 (N.Z.); JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v. Pugachev
[2017] EWHC (Ch) 2426 (Eng.).
156 Armitage v. Nurse [1998] Ch 241 at 253 (Eng.).
157 See generally HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY
OF CONTRACTS (2017).
151
152
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retain their unique autonomy-enhancing function.158 Therefore,
the “irreducible core” requirement is itself autonomy-enhancing.159
B. Inward-Looking Safeguards
There are a number of inward-looking safeguards that ensure that express trusts are only created where settlors conclusively intend to do so.
First, as discussed earlier, a Statute of Frauds and a Wills
Act will often provide the requisite formality requirement for the
creation or enforcement of certain inter vivos or testamentary
express trusts.160 These ensure that an express trust becomes
legally enforceable only where the settlor has “deliberately interacted”161 with the device, indicating a decisive decision to settle
her property on trust.162 This is particularly critical because express
trusts can be created unilaterally.163 Thus, where the settlor or
There is a live debate as to whether Millett LJ correctly identified the
content of the irreducible core. See, e.g., James Penner, Exemptions, in BREACH OF
TRUST (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto-Sakmann eds., 2002); Sales, supra note
153, at 131. But even if one disagrees with Millett LJ, the point made remains
valid: the irreducible core—whatever it is—does not curb autonomy but ensures
that express trusts retain their integrity in order to enhance personal autonomy.
159 The same may also explain what Langbein has termed the “benefit-thebeneficiary requirement[,]” which are mandatory trusts rules that require
“that the trust and its terms must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries”—
that settlors may not impose “manifestly value-impairing restrictions on the
use or disposition of the trust property ....” Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra
note 83, at 1107–09. Langbein considers that such rules interfere with settlor
autonomy but justifies them on the basis of “a change-of-circumstances doctrine[,]” which is the argument that those rules respond to the inability of
dead settlors to change their mind where the consequence of their unwise
course of action materializes. However, a better explanation, which covers all
cases, whether the settlor is dead or alive, is found in another passage in
Langbein’s paper—that “[t]rust law’s deference to the settlor’s direction always presupposes that the direction is beneficiary-regarding.” Id. at 1112. It
is a structural feature of express trusts that they exist for the benefit of beneficiaries. See Derwent Coshott, To Benefit Another: A Theory of the Express Trust,
136 L.Q. REV. 221, 221–22 (2020). It is no surprise, therefore, that the law
neutralizes trust provisions that threaten to erode that structural feature.
160 See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
161 See GARDNER, supra note 76, at 30.
162 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 83, at 1121.
163 See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 652.
158
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testator fails to indicate a conclusive intention to create a trust, the
purported arrangement is not enforceable as an express trust.164
It might be asked whether the scope of the safeguard afforded by the formality requirements for inter vivos express
trusts extend far enough. At the present time, in England and
most jurisdictions in America, the formality requirement extends only to interests in land.165 This is perhaps explicable on
an historical basis: land was the most valuable form of property
when the Statute of Frauds 1677 was enacted in England, thus
explaining the desire of the then legislature to ensure individuals
meaningfully engaged with the express trust device before an
interest in land was conclusively given away on trust.166 In the
modern day, however, the justification for singling out land is of
lesser force, since other types of properties—or high value assets
whatever assets they may be—may pose an equal if not stronger
case for formality protection.167 It may well be that the hesitancy
to extend the scope of formalities reflects the common assumption that formality requirements unduly fetter settlor autonomy;168 but this assumption is mistaken, since formalities secure
personal autonomy.169 A strong commitment to autonomy may
require the scope of formalities to be revisited and expanded.170
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
166 See HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, at 1–2.
167 As Lon L. Fuller writes, formalities secure the desiderata of providing
an “evidentiary”, “cautionary”, and “channeling” function. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–01 (1941). “Where men make
laws for themselves it is desirable that they should do so under conditions guaranteeing [that] desiderata .... Furthermore, the greater the assurance that these
desiderata are satisfied, the larger the scope we may be willing to ascribe to
private autonomy.” Id. at 813–14. In the modern day, land does not hold an
exclusive stronghold on the logic of requiring the satisfaction of that desiderata.
168 See, e.g., Ross Grantham & Darryn Jensen, Coherence in the Age of Statutes,
42 MONASH U. L. REV. 360, 373 (2016) (“[Formality] provisions override individual autonomy in cases in which the required formalities or evidential requirements are not satisfied.”); Franziska Myburgh, On Constitutive Formalities,
Estoppel and Breaking the Rules, 27 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 254, 256 (2016)
((writing in the context of contracts law): formalities “limit contractual freedom
in a legal system where the point of departure is that contractual liability is
based on the will of the parties.”).
169 See Fuller, supra note 167, at 801.
170 See id. at 823.
164
165
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Secondly, settlor autonomy is safeguarded through the requirement of an “external expression of intention”171: “the mere
existence of some unexpressed intention in the breast of the owner
of the property does nothing: there must at least be some expression
of that intention before it can effect any result.”172 “[T]he devil
himself knoweth not the thought of man.”173 Requiring intentions
to journey from thought to deed ensures settlors meaningfully
engage with the express trust device before legal consequences
will ensue.174
A third safeguard is found in the objective ascertainment
of intention. A settlor is taken to have chosen to create a trust
only where there is an expression of intention to create the rights
and duties that constitute a trust relationship.175 Thus, unless
the settlor “manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties
on the transferee”176 and “intend[s] the words to be imperative ...
no trust is created.”177 On the other hand, the law does not require
the settlor also to appreciate “that the intended relationship is
called a trust” or to understand “the precise characteristics of a
trust relationship.”178 It is the substance of the settlor’s choices
that the law objectively ascertains and gives legal effect.179
It might be asked whether securing the settlor’s right to
exit—to revoke a trust—is necessary to safeguard settlor autonomy. In the context of property and contract law, Hanoch Dagan
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 13 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001).
Re Vandervell’s Trs. (No 2) [1974] Ch 269 (CA) at 294 (Eng.). The law
does not, however, require that the intention is communicated to anyone. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 13 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001); Standing v.
Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282 (CA), at 288–89 (Eng.); Fletcher v. Fletcher (1844) 67
Eng. Rep. 67; 4 Hare 67 (Eng.); Cf. Simon Douglas & Ben McFarlane, Sham
Trusts, in 9 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 240, 243 (Heather Conway &
Robin Hickey eds., 2017).
173 James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY
AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 435, 435 (1913) (quoting Y. B. 7 Ed. IV, f.
2, pl. 2).
174 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 13 cmts. a–b (AM. L. INST. 2001).
175 Id. § 13 cmt. a.
176 Id. § 13 cmt. d.
177 Knight v. Knight (1840) 49 Eng. Rep. 58, 68; (1840) 3 Beav 148 (Eng.).
178 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 13 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001); see Paul
v. Constance (1977) 1 WLR 527 at 532–33 (Eng.).
179 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 13 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001).
171
172
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has argued that self-determination requires private law to secure
“people’s right to exit their existing property arrangement.”180
This is precisely what § 602(a) of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC)
provides: “[u]nless the terms of a trust expressly provide that the
trust is irrevocable, the settlor may revoke or amend the trust.”181 If
a default right to exit is necessary to secure settlor autonomy, then
the common law position, which is that the settlor drops out of the
picture once an express trust has been properly set up,182 unduly
fetters the autonomy-enhancing function of express trusts.183
The answer is in the negative. Charles Fried writes that
“over the last two centuries citizens in the liberal democracies
have become increasingly free to dispose of their talents, labor,
and property as seems best to them.”184 That freedom provided
by the liberal state loses its meaning if the default legal position
is that a disposition can be recalled.185 This is why a donor who
chooses to make a gift loses the right to exit once the gift is properly
made: her autonomy would be unduly fettered if her clear actions to
dispose were held to be ineffective simply because it was not accompanied by certain necessary words.186 This is not to say that the
right to exit is never compatible with personal autonomy.187
However, “[a] change of mind that is truly relevant to personal
autonomy, or to the safeguarding of authenticity in one’s pursuits, would be, for the most part at least, rational.”188 A rule that
Dagan, supra note 62, at 178.
See D.M. English, The American Uniform Trust Code, in EXTENDING
THE BOUNDARIES OF TRUST AND SIMILAR RING-FENCED FUNDS 313, 353 (David
Hayton ed., 2002).
182 See In re Astor’s Settlement Trs. [1952] Ch 534 at 542 (Eng.); Re Murphy’s
Settlements (1999) 1 WLR 282 at 295 (Eng.).
183 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 63 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
184 FRIED, supra note 94, at 21.
185 See Kimel, supra note 57, at 96.
186 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 117, at 7.
187 See Kimel, supra note 57, at 101 (“[I]t may be thought that a considerable freedom to change one’s mind is just as essential for the ongoing pursuit
of personal autonomy as is the capacity and the willingness to make long-term
commitments or to persevere with past choices.”); Langbein, Contractarian
Basis, supra note 5, at 673 (discussing nonprobate wills which allow settlor to
use and enjoy property before death).
188 Kimel, supra note 57, at 102.
180
181
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provides that a settlor who properly sets up a trust loses the right
to revoke the trust unless such a power is expressly retained better
reduces the risk of irrational changes of mind.189 After all, a trust
by default entails divestment instead of retention, and to reverse
that default position would unduly curb settlor autonomy.190
It might then be asked how § 602(a) of the UTC can be
explained: what might guide American states in deciding whether
to adopt that provision? An answer lies in cost-efficiency.191 As
D.M. English explains, that provision reflects “the increasing if
not predominant use of the revocable trust in the United States.”192
In states where that is a demonstrably true empirical fact, then
adopting a presumption of revocability may be justified since it
would save overall transaction costs by institutionalizing that
common practice.193 A balancing act is called for between costsavings and personal autonomy, and where the balance tilts in
favor of the former, then the adoption of § 602(a) is justified.194
C. Outward-Looking Safeguards
Express trusts are first and foremost concerned with enhancing settlor autonomy, an unsurprising proposition given
that the settlor is the absolute owner of the trust property prior
to the creation of the trust.195 However, this does not mean that
settlors are given free rein to treat trustees and beneficiaries
simply as a means to her desired ends.196 Given that trusts are
relational in nature, certain outward-looking safeguards protect
the autonomy of others who are potentially affected by the settlor’s choices.197
See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Note, Is it Time for Irrevocable Wills?, 53 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 393, 422 (2016) (discussing how irrevocable transfers prevents a change of mind in the future when potentially incompetent).
190 See id. at 398; see also FRIED, supra note 94, at 20–21 (“[T]o respect
those determinations of the self is to respect their persistence over time.”).
191 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 63 rep.’s notes cmts. b–d (AM. L. INST.
2001).
192 English, supra note 181, at 326.
193 See id.
194 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 63 rep.’s notes cmts. b–d (AM. L. INST. 2001).
195 Id. § 2.
196 See, e.g., id.
197 See, e.g., id. § 35(2) cmt. a.
189
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Most obviously, trustees198 are free to disclaim trusteeship
and beneficiaries199 are free to disclaim interests under a trust for
any reason at all.200 This ensures that their personal autonomy
is not unduly curbed, a consequence that would follow if the law
forced upon them rights and duties intended by the settlor.201 Even
after indicating acceptance at the outset, trustees and beneficiaries
are still capable of exercising their right to exit.202 Thus, trustees
are free to resign,203 and beneficiaries are free to release204 (or
assign205) their interests to others. Of course, they may not do so
without consequence if, for example, a trustee had committed a
prior breach of trust, or the assignment of the beneficiary’s interest would impose a burden on the assignee.206 To allow trustees
and beneficiaries to have their cake and eat it would be to sanction
undue encroachment into settlor autonomy.207
Another outward-looking safeguard is found in the objective approach towards ascertaining settlor intention, specifically
the law’s refusal to allow the settlor’s secret or unexpressed intention to dictate the existence or terms of the trust.208 In the
See id.; Robinson v. Pett (1734) 24 Eng. Rep. 249 at 251; 3 P Wms 249
at 251 (Eng.).
199 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 51 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2001); Hardoon v
Belilios [1901] AC 118 at 123 (Eng.).
200 See generally Ying Khai Liew & Charles Mitchell, The Creation of Express Trusts, 11 J.EQUITY 133 (2017).
201 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 35 rep.’s notes cmt. a (AM. L. INST.
2001).
202 Id. § 35 cmt. b.
203 Id. § 36; DAVID HAYTON ET AL., UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW RELATING
TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES ¶ 1.28(f) (19th ed. 2016) [hereinafter UNDERHILL &
HAYTON]. An express trust does not fail for want of a trustee. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRS. § 14 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2001); Phillips v. Sch. Bd. for London
(1898) 2 QB 447 at 458 (Eng.); In re Frame [1939] Ch 700 at 703–04 (Eng.).
204 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 51 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2001).
205 YING KHAI LIEW, GUEST ON THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT ch. 3 (3d ed. 2018)
[hereinafter LIEW, GUEST].
206 See Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Mfrs. (1900) Ltd. [1902] 2
KB 660 at 668 (Eng.); LIEW, GUEST, supra note 205, at ch. 9. Unless, of
course, the assignee assents to this. U.C.C. § 2-210 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2017).
207 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. §§ 70 cmt. a, 104 cmt. f.
208 See id. § 4; Cartwright v. Jackson Cap. Partners, Ltd. P’ship, 478 S.W.3d
596, 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015); Re Vandervell’s Trs. (No 2) [1974] Ch 269
(CA) at 294 (Eng.); Twinsectra Ltd. v. Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 at 185 (Eng.);
Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253, 263 (Austl.).
198
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Australian case of Byrnes v. Kendle, a settlor argued that a trust
instrument he executed was void and of no effect because he had
subjectively and secretly intended not to create a trust when the
instrument was executed.209 The High Court of Australia rejected
his contention.210 Concerning the objective approach to ascertaining
intention, Gummow and Hayne JJ made the following comment:
There is good sense in such a rule. Issues of the construction
to be placed upon the words or actions of alleged settlors are apt
to arise long after the event .... Further, trusts give rise to proprietary interests, dealings which may engage third parties who
are strangers to the original actors.211

The point is clear. Putative trustees and beneficiaries, as
well as third parties who have dealings with the trust, obviously
ascertain the settlor’s intention objectively, as they are not privy
to the settlor’s inner thoughts.212 By refusing to allow a settlor’s
subjective intention to override that objectively ascertained intention, the law ensures that the basis upon which others choose
whether or not to be a party to (or deal with) the trust remains
constant throughout the lifetime of the trust.213
Finally, it is a mandatory rule, applicable to all equitable
property interests generally, that an acquirer of equitable property who is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice takes
free of any prior equitable interest in it.214 Any attempt by settlors to negate this rule will therefore be of no effect.215 This
provides another outward-looking safeguard, which ensures that
Byrnes, (2011) 243 CLR at 260.
Id. at 271.
211 Id. at 274.
212 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 12 cmts. a–b (AM. L. INST. 2001).
213 In the same vein, Fuller writes, in relation to contracts law: “[i]t has
been suggested that in some cases the courts might properly give an interpretation to a written contract inconsistent with the actual understanding of
either party. What justification can there be for such a view? We answer, it
rests upon the need for promoting the security of transactions.” Fuller, supra
note 167, at 808 (citation omitted).
214 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 2 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2001);
Venables v. Hornby (Inspector of Taxes) [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1277, [¶ 18] (Eng.).
215 This is in line with the fact that beneficial interests under a trust have
proprietary effects. See, e.g., Penner, supra note 78, at 473; Peter Jaffey,
Explaining the Trust, 131 L.Q. REV. 377, 385–86 (2015).
209
210
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settlors’ exercise of autonomy does not result in the overriding of
bona fide third-party acquirers’ interests during the lifetime of
the trust without justification.216
D. External Limits
Autonomy is not an absolute value, and therefore it must
sometimes give way to other normative concerns.217 One of the
most fundamental limitations is the need for choices to be “morally
acceptable”218 and made pursuant to “legitimate ends”.219 Therefore,
trusts or trust provisions that are formed for unlawful, criminal,
or tortious purposes, or those contrary to public policy, are void.220
Moreover, express trusts set up solely to deceive others (such as
the court or the settlor’s creditors) are potentially invalid.221
Another external limit relates to economic concerns. Perpetuity rules may be understood in these terms: they limit settlor
autonomy in order to prevent trust property from being unduly
incapacitated or sterilized within the free market, thereby facilitating market liquidity and the utilization of wealth.222
A third limit has been noted in the earlier discussion concerning the rule in Saunders v. Vautier, which is pre-existing
categories of property interests within the legal system.223 The
interest that a settlor intends to grant to the beneficiary must be
an interest the legal system recognizes.224 Where there is a
See Jaffey, supra note 215, at 389–91.
See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 379–80.
218 Id. at 378.
219 Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, in NORMATIVITY AND NORMS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KELSENIAN THEMES 458 (Stanley
L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson eds., 1999).
220 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 29 (AM. L. INST. 2001); UNDERHILL &
HAYTON, supra note 203, ¶¶ 11.1(1), 7.1(f).
221 In England, by virtue of the sham trusts doctrine, see Liew, Sham
Trusts, supra note 130, at 237; in America, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS.
§ 29 rep’s notes cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001).
222 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 29 rep.’s notes cl. (b) cmts. g–h (AM. L.
INST. 2001); Paul Matthews, The Comparative Importance of the Rule in Saunders
v. Vautier, 122 L.Q. REV. 266, 277–79 (2006). Matthews doubts the economic
rationale of perpetuity rules but recognizes that the economic argument led
to the invention of those rules. See id.
223 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 40 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2001).
224 See id.
216
217
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misalignment between the interest intended by the settlor and
the pre-existing categories of property interests, courts approximate the settlor’s intention to the closest possible recognized
category of interest.225 Since express trusts do not operate in a
vacuum, choices made by the settlor may not always be given
full legal effect.226
III.CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
A. Ground-Clearing
The law of constructive trusts covers a multitude of circumstances or doctrines, and it is clear that not every constructive
trust doctrine enhances autonomy,227 although some clearly do.
The aim of this section is to demonstrate how some of those do,
and that they do so in such a way that complements the autonomyenhancing work of express and resulting trusts.
Before embarking on that discussion, some ground-clearing
work is called for. It is often thought that fundamental differences
exist between constructive trusts in America and in England.228
For our purposes, two aspects of that perceived difference require investigation.
The first concerns the nature of constructive trusts. In
America, “a constructive trust is ‘not a real trust’ since it is ‘only
a remedy.’”229 In contrast, English courts have strenuously rejected
“remedial” constructive trusts, preferring only to recognize “institutional” ones.230 The second concerns the basis of constructive
See id. § 4 cmt. a.
Id. § 40 cmt. d.
227 For example, bribes or secret commissions received by those in breach
of their fiduciary duties are held on constructive trust for their principals in order
to ensure undivided loyalty, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010), or to ensure that a fiduciary
does not rely on her own breach to retain a profit, see FHR Eur. Ventures
LLP v. Cedar Cap. Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45 [11] (Eng.).
228 See R.M. James, The Constructive Trust: A Substantive Institution or a
Remedial Institution?, 8 TRENT L.J. 75, 75–78 (1984).
229 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. b
(AM. L. INST. 2010).
230 See, e.g., In re Sharpe [1980] 1 WLR 219 at 225 (Eng.); Lonrho P.L.C. v.
Fayed (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1 at 9 (Eng.); In re Goldcorp Exch. Ltd. [1995] 1
225
226
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trusts.231 In America, the prevailing view is that constructive trusts
respond to unjust enrichment,232 and are therefore substantively
dealt with in the R3RUE,233 and not in the R3T.234 In contrast,
English law does not view constructive trusts as being susceptible to a single unifying rationale: they are understood as being
“imposed in a wide variety of circumstances, and for a number of
different reasons.”235 Moreover, English courts have never “subscribed to the view that all constructive trusts respond to unjust
enrichment, [although] they have held that some do.”236
If these differences are material differences, then American constructive trusts fall to be theorized and justified within
the law of remedies and/or the law of unjust enrichment (along
with some of those that respond to unjust enrichment in English
AC 74 at 76, 103–04 (Eng.); In re Polly Peck Int’l P.L.C. (No. 2) [1998] 3 All ER
812 at 827, 831 (Eng.); Sinclair Invs. Ltd. v. Versailles Trade Fin. Ltd. [2011]
EWCA (Civ) 347 [37], [2012] Ch 453 [37] (Eng.); FHR Eur. Ventures [2014] UKSC
45 [47], [2015] AC 250 [47] (Eng.); Angove’s Pty. Ltd. v. Bailey [2016] UKSC 47
[27] (Eng.). On the institutional/remedial distinction, see Ying Khai Liew, Reanalysing Institutional and Remedial Constructive Trusts, 74 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 528,
529–32, 544–45 (2016).
231 See James, supra note 228, at 78, 80–82.
232 The extent to which unjust enrichment is said to underlie the law of
constructive trusts varies from author to author. For example, HESS ET AL.,
BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 47, suggests that “the imposition of a
constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment is probably the primary basis
at the present time” (emphasis added); while Comment e of the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts simply asserts that (all?) constructive trusts are imposed “to
redress a wrong or to prevent unjust enrichment.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRS. § 1 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2001).
233 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1),
(2), cmts. b, f (AM. L. INST. 2010).
234 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 1 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2001).
235 ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT ¶ 3836 (Charles Mitchell et al. eds., 9th ed. 2016). This is not to deny that common
rationales may underlie seemingly disparate constructive trust doctrines, and
that it may be useful to understand constructive trusts by way of those groupings.
For arguments of this kind, see, e.g., GBOLAHAN ELIAS, EXPLAINING CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS (1990); Ben McFarlane, Constructive Trusts Arising on a Receipt of
Property Sub Conditione, 120 L.Q. REV. 667, 667–68, 694–95 (2004); Simon
Gardner, Reliance-Based Constructive Trusts, in CONSTRUCTIVE AND RESULTING
TRUSTS, supra note 109, at 63; LIEW, RATIONALISING, supra note 112. The
point is that constructive trusts are not understood as susceptible to a single
explanation, as is thought to be the case in America.
236 See GOFF & JONES, supra note 235, ¶ 38-36.
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law), as opposed to trusts law.237 But careful examination indicates
that those differences are in fact often more apparent than real.238
1. Remedy?
First, the way in which American constructive trusts are
“remedial” is demonstrably different from the “remedial” constructive trusts objected to by English courts, as utilized, for example, in Australia.239 In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v.
Islington LBC, Lord Browne-Wilkinson described an “institutional
constructive trust” as a nondiscretionary trust arising “by operation of law as from the date of the circumstances which give rise
to it: the function of the court is merely to declare that such trust
has arisen in the past”; while a “remedial constructive trust” was
described as “a judicial remedy giving rise to an enforceable equitable obligation: the extent to which it operates retrospectively
to the prejudice of third parties lies in the discretion of the court.”240
American constructive trusts do not fall within this conception of
“remedial”.241 For example, the R3RUE rejects the view that constructive trusts are “created” or “imposed” by judges; instead, the
phrase “constructive trust” is taken to be “a judicial shorthand
describing the parties’ pre-existing interests in particular property”: a constructive trust is “a declaratory judgment about the state
of title to property,” therefore “the constructive trust ‘exists’ from
the moment of the transaction on which restitution is based.”242
Thus, American constructive trusts do not provide for the kind
of discretion envisaged by English courts.243
See Robert Stevens, When and Why Does Unjustified Enrichment Justify
the Recognition of Proprietary Rights?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 919, 926 (2012).
238 See Leonard I. Rotman, Deconstructing the Constructive Trust, 37 ALBERTA
L. REV. 133, 134–35, 138–41 (1999).
239 Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, 594, 613, 615 (Austl.).
240 [1996] AC 669 at 714–15.
241 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt.
e (AM. L. INST. 2010).
242 Id.
243 See Andrew Kull, The Metaphorical Constructive Trust, 18 TRS. & TRUSTEES
945, 953–54 (2012). It might be thought that the word “may” in section 55(1)
of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment suggests the
potential for the exercise of discretion. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
& UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1) (AM. L. INST. 2010). That subsection provides:
237
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Discretion aside, however, it remains to be asked whether
American constructive trusts are “real trusts,” as in England, or
simply “a remedy.” In the R3RUE, “constructive trust” is touted
as a “metaphor” that should be abandoned in favor of a direct
recognition of the fact that:
[E]very judicial order recognizing that ‘B holds X in constructive
trust for A’ may be seen to comprise, in effect, two remedial
components. The first of these is a declaration that B’s legal
title to X is subject to A’s superior equitable claim. The second
is a mandatory injunction directing B to surrender X to A or
to take equivalent steps.244

At least in certain circumstances, however, this analysis
is unhelpfully reductive, because it does not provide any conceptual room for recognizing that a real (constructive) trust may have
arisen prior to the judicial order, and that that real trust might
serve as the basis for the declaration and injunction awarded by
the court.245
Consider, for example, the case of Re Duke of Marlbor246
ough. The Duchess of Marlborough assigned the leasehold of a
house to the Duke absolutely, on the basis of an informal agreement
that he would raise a mortgage in his own name and reconvey the
equity of redemption back to the Duchess.247 The Duke died before
he could reconvey, and the court held that the Duchess, and not the
Duke’s creditors, could lay claim to the equity of redemption.248
If a defendant is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title
to identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or in
violation of the claimant’s rights, the defendant may be declared a
constructive trustee, for the benefit of the claimant, of the
property in question and its traceable product[.]
Id. (emphasis added). It would seem, however, that the term “may” is used to
indicate that some but not all categories of unjust enrichment will attract the
constructive trust. It does not entail that judges have discretion on a case-bycase basis to determine if a constructive trust ought to be imposed.
244 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55
cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
245 Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918–1919: Equity, 33 HARV. L.
REV. 420, 420–23 (1920).
246 In re Duke of Marlborough [1894] 2 Ch 133, a case that the U.S. Supreme Court has found occasion to approve. See Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech,
169 U.S. 398, 411 (1897).
247 In re Duke of Marlborough [1894] 2 Ch 133.
248 Id.
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The only way to explain this outcome is that the Duchess was a
beneficiary under a real (constructive)249 trust that arose from
the moment the Duke obtained legal title to the house.250 How
else could the court justify according priority to the Duchess
over the Duke’s creditors?
Another example is where a claimant seeks equitable compensation against the defendant on the basis that a constructive
trust arose in the past over property in the defendant’s hands and
that the defendant had wrongfully disposed of the property.251
Although the remedy sought is not a declaration of a constructive
trust, nevertheless the fact that a real (constructive) trust historically arose would inform the court as to whether the claimant succeeds and (if so) the extent of the compensation award.252
In sum, it would be mistaken to suggest that all constructive trusts in America are simply constitutive of the remedies
awarded by the court in the relevant action.253 As in England,
the constructive trust may well be a real trust, arising at an identifiable point in time before the judicial order, and which serves to
explain the remedy ultimately awarded, whether a declaration
of a constructive trust or some other remedy.254
2. Unjust Enrichment?
Secondly, in some instances, including those that are substantively discussed in this Article, “unjust enrichment” fails to suffice
as an explanation or rationale for why constructive trusts arise.255
As Lusina Ho explains, by treating the diverse range of situations256
Because the arrangement was made informally, it could not have been
enforced as an express trust: see discussion above at Section II.A.2.
250 See in re Duke of Marlborough [1894] 2 Ch 133.
251 See, for example, the facts of Pain v Pain [2006] QSC 335 (Austl.).
252 Terence Etherton, Constructive Trusts: A New Model for Equity and
Unjust Enrichment, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 265, 266–68, 283–84 (2008).
253 See Rotman, supra note 238, at 139 & n.35.
254 John L. Dewar, The Development of the Remedial Trust, 60 CAN. BAR
REV. 265, 265, 267–68 (1982).
255 See Lusina Ho, Proprietary Remedies for Unjust Enrichment: Demystifying the Constructive Trust and Analysing Intentions, in THE RESTATEMENT
THIRD: RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE
ESSAYS 209, 211 (Charles Mitchell & William Swadling eds., 2013).
256 See generally id. For example, enrichment arising from impaired or
qualified intent, wrongdoing, ownership in real estate of unmarried cohabitants, informal oral trusts, and secret testamentary trusts.
249
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in which constructive trusts arise as involving unjust enrichment,
“R3RUE has stretched the concept of unjust enrichment so widely
that it fails to offer any meaningful guidelines on how the discretion
will be exercised.”257 In other words, “unjust enrichment,” presented as a rationale, is sometimes question-begging.258
Take for example what English law calls “the rule in Re
Rose,”259 a substantially similar rule of which is found in § 16
Comment c R3T.260 The rule provides that a constructive trust
arises where a property owner (A) does everything in her power
to transfer property to another (B), either as a gift to B or for B
to hold on trust, but the title remains in A due to some “technical defect or incompleteness in the intended transfer.”261 The
explanation provided in the R3T is that the constructive trust
arises “to prevent the unjust enrichment that would occur if the
property owner’s successors in interest were allowed to retain or
acquire property that is satisfactorily shown to have been intended to benefit others.”262 But this merely states a conclusion,
and not the reason or rationale for the rule. In particular, it does
not explain why the constructive trust would arise when B is clearly
a volunteer, and given that a mere promise short of a contract or a
properly declared express trust is not normally enforceable. Once
we look beyond unjust enrichment, however, an explanation can be
found. As is the case in England,263 the rationale lies in a consideration of A’s actions—that A “had arrived at a definite, considered
Id. at 211.
“[T]his begs the question whether the relevant property is beneficially
owned by the insolvent recipient[.]” Id. at 215. Indeed, tellingly, section 7 comment
d of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts says that a constructive trust is imposed
“because the court concludes that the person holding the title to the property,
if permitted to keep it, would profit by a wrong or would be unjustly enriched.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 7 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2001) (emphasis added).
259 The rule is in fact reflected in the two coincidentally named cases of In
re Rose, [1949] 1 Ch 78 (Eng.) and In re Rose, Rose v. IRC [1952] 1 Ch 499 (Eng.).
260 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 16 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 In Milroy v. Lord, (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 264 at 274 (Eng.), Turner LJ
held that, “in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, [A] must
have done everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in
the settlement, was necessary to be done in order to transfer the property and
render the settlement binding upon him.” This statement is taken to be the
basis for the rule in In re Rose. See Mascall v. Mascall [1985] 50 P & CR 119,
at 126 (Eng.).
257
258
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intention to create a trust either immediately or soon thereafter.”264 This is the reason why A’s successors in interest would be
unjustly enriched if permitted to keep the property.265
Take secret trusts as another example.266 The R3T suggests that the reason why they give rise to constructive trusts267
is that the testator’s “testate or intestate successor would be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain the property.”268 Again, this
provides a conclusion and not the reason or rationale for the rule.
Digging deeper, however, it can be seen that secret trusts arise
because the “testator leaves property to a recipient in reliance on
the recipient’s promise to convey the property to specified third persons, and the recipient repudiates the promise after the death of
the testator[.]”269 As in England,270 it is the elements of promise and
reliance that explain why the testator’s successor would be unjustly
enriched if permitted to keep the testator’s property.271 Indeed,
once promise and reliance are properly recognized as the rationale
for secret trusts, it becomes clear that they also provide the reason
for other Anglo-American “agreement-based constructive trusts,”
that is, those arising in the context of an informal agreement. These
include272 inter vivos iterations of the secret trust situation, where a
property owner (A) transfers property to another (B) in reliance on
the latter’s informal promise to hold on trust;273 purchases at a
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 16 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
Id.
266 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46 cmt.
g (AM. L. INST. 2010).
267 Secret trusts are enforced as constructive trusts. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46 (AM. L. INST. 2010);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 18 (AM. L. INST. 2001). They are therefore
exempted from any formality requirement due to section 8 of the Statute of
Frauds of 1677. See HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 67.
268 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 18 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001).
269 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46
cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 2010).
270 See LIEW, RATIONALISING, supra note 112, at ch. 4.
271 Wrongdoing, in the form of repudiation, is not in fact required. Cf. HESS
ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 471. This can be demonstrated by
asking what would happen if the recipient dies soon after the testator, without having had the opportunity to renege (or to carry out her promise). Clearly
the arrangement would be enforceable as a secret trust. This demonstrates
that wrongdoing is not necessary after all.
272 All these are further discussed in LIEW, RATIONALISING, supra note 112.
273 England: Rochefoucauld v. Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 196 at 196, 205–06;
America: HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, §§ 495–97.
264
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judicial sale or auction where one party (A) allows another (B) to
purchase the property in reliance on B’s promise to hold the
property (wholly or partly) on trust;274 and mutual wills cases,
where one party (A) dies leaving property to another (B) in reliance on B’s promise to leave the property at B’s death to another.275
The point of the examples cited above is not to deny that
unjust enrichment may well provide a sound276 explanation where
constructive trusts secure restitution in circumstances where the
relevant triggering event—the discrete source of rights—is unjust
enrichment.277 Such constructive trusts project rights backwards:
being “restitutionary in pattern,”278 they return or restore an interest to a property owner.279 Therefore, in these cases it may well
be that the explanation for why a constructive trust arises to compel
B to restore the property to A lies in unjust enrichment.280 But
these are not the only type of constructive trusts:281 others, including those discussed above, have the effect of projecting rights
forwards, that is, conferring beneficial interests to those intended to
benefit.282 Given its inherent restitutionary logic, unjust enrichment is unable to provide a sufficient explanation for forwardprojecting constructive trusts.283 Once we are prepared to look
England: Pallant v. Morgan [1953] Ch 43 at 43; America: HESS ET AL.,
BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 471.
275 England: Dufour v. Pereira (1769) Dick 419 at 420–21; 21 ER 332;
America: HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 499.
276 Albeit partial. See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (2004).
277 In America, the preference is to treat the triggering event as “unjustified enrichment”, that is, where there is “enrichment that lacks an adequate
legal basis.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1
cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010). In England, the defendant must have been enriched
unjustly at the claimant’s expense on the basis of established “unjust factors[.]”
GOFF & JONES, supra note 235, ¶ 1-21.
278 GOFF & JONES, supra note 235, ¶ 38-46.
279 See GOFF & JONES, supra note 235, ¶ 38-46.
280 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55
(AM. L. INST. 2010).
281 It is arguably better to categorize trusts responding to unjust enrichment
as resulting trusts, as is increasingly the trend in England, since resulting trusts
are invariably restitutionary in pattern. See Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the
Production of Legal Doctrine, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 993, 1023–24 (2008).
282 See infra Section III.B.
283 See D.W.M. Waters, The Constructive Trust in Evolution: Substantive
and Remedial, 10 TRS. & ESTS. J. 334, 336 n.7 (1991).
274
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beyond the unjust enrichment rhetoric, however, it becomes clear
that forward-projecting constructive trusts have a crucial role to
play within trusts law in enhancing personal autonomy.284
B. The Role of Constructive Trusts in Enhancing Autonomy
Take agreement-based constructive trusts first. These give
content to the relational aspect of autonomy: they allow property
owners “to extend their reach by legitimately enlisting others to
their own goals, purposes, and projects.”285 This complements the
autonomy-enhancing role of express trusts, which gives effect to
a property owner’s unilateral engagement with the trust facility.286
The autonomy-enhancing work of constructive trusts can
be appreciated from two points of view.
From A’s point of view, the law would unduly curb A’s autonomy if she was prevented from enlisting B to achieve her goals
simply because the informality of the arrangement prevents it
from being enforced as an express trust.287 Certainly, as discussed
above, formality requirements provide an inward-looking safeguard to ensure that express trusts are only created where property owners conclusively wish to do so; and property owners are
most at risk of purporting to set up trusts without due consideration when they declare themselves trustees of their property for
another.288 But in agreement-based constructive trust situations,
A relies on B’s promise, and such reliance supplies part of the
reason why the law enforces the informal agreement between the
parties: A not only obtains B’s consent to participate in the compact, but relies in a maximally decisive manner by giving up A’s
own property (or A’s clear opportunity to acquire property) in
order to vest the property in B’s hands.289 This justifies protecting the relational aspect of A’s autonomy through the constructive
trust.290 The element of reliance here is “not as an independent
See infra Section III.B.
Dagan, supra note 62, at 182 (emphasis added).
286 See George P. Costigan, Jr., The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting, and Constructive, 27 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437–38 (1914).
287 See HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 471.
288 See supra Section II.A.
289 See Fuller, supra note 167, at 811.
290 Id.
284
285
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or competing basis of liability but as a ground supplementing
and reinforcing the principle of private autonomy”291 from a relational perspective. A’s reliance on B’s promise justifies the constructive trust, which enhances A’s autonomy by giving her the
freedom to enlist B to achieving A’s goals and aims.292
From B’s point of view, when B acquires the property in
question,293 B becomes its legal owner and for that reason is
empowered with the legal power to exclude all others from interfering with the property.294 But it would unduly undermine A’s
autonomy if that empowerment went unchecked such that B could
exclude A, given the background story leading up to B’s acquisition
of the property.295 B’s acquisition of the property was directly
facilitated by A’s act of reliance, and B’s promise was not simply
any promise, but a promise that B would take only a qualified interest in the very property that B obtains through A’s reliance on
B’s promise.296 It is unsurprising, then, that striking a balance
between A’s and B’s autonomy requires a constructive trust to
arise from the moment of acquisition, to compel B to hold the
property according to the terms of her promise.297
Next, consider Re Rose constructive trusts.298 These give
content to the idea that autonomy is determined as a matter of
Id. Hence, the outcome does not depend on the extent of detrimental reliance A incurs, as it does in the context of estoppel. For the English body of
law, see LIEW, RATIONALISING, supra note 112, at ch. 6. For the American body of
law, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 27
cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010)).
292 See Fuller, supra note 167, at 811–12.
293 In secret trusts, mutual wills, and the inter vivos context, B acquires
the property directly from A; in the context of a purchase at a judicial sale or
auction, B acquires the property from a third-party vendor.
294 David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from
Private Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
39, 40 (2000).
295 See Fuller, supra note 167, at 807.
296 See id. at 810–12.
297 Lorenzo Maniscalco, Common Intentions and Constructive Trusts: Unorthodoxy in Trusts of Land, CONV. & PROP. LAW. 124, 128 (2020).
298 Abigail Doggett, Explaining Re Rose: The Search Goes On?, 62 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 241, 264 (2003). Note that the terminology of “Re Rose constructive trusts”,
where employed in the context of the present discussion, is taken to include
the American version of the rule. See supra text accompanying notes 260–64.
291
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substance and not form.299 Where A does everything in her power
necessary to transfer property to B, A “arrive[s] at a definite, considered intention”300 to make the transfer. The constructive trust
secures A’s substantive decision, indicated through her actions,
and endows it with legal effect, even though in form the legal title
remains in A’s name.301
The substance-over-form approach is not at odds with the
formality requirements necessary for the transfer of the legal title of
certain forms of property.302 It was discussed earlier, in the context
of express trusts, that statutory formality requirements enhance
personal autonomy by ensuring that certain express trusts are only
created or enforced where settlors conclusively intend to create
one.303 The same logic, which applies to formality requirements for
the transfer of legal title, is consistent with the autonomyenhancing role of the Re Rose constructive trusts.304 Thus, compliance with any relevant formality requirement for the transfer
of the legal title is a prerequisite for a Re Rose constructive trust
to arise, since non-compliance entails that A would not have done
“everything in her power” to transfer the property to B.305 Where
such formality requirements have been complied with, however,
then excessively requiring form as an indicator of A’s exercise of
autonomy—that is, by taking the location of the legal title of the
property as conclusive indication of A’s choices—unduly fetters A’s
personal autonomy.306 Re Rose constructive trusts ensure that
the substance of A’s choices is respected.307
299 Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540, 558 (Austl.). The rule “gives effect
to the clear intention and actions of the donor rather than insisting upon
strict compliance with legal forms. It is a reflection of the maxim ‘equity looks
to the intent rather than the form.’” Id.
300 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 16 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
301 Id.
302 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 83, at 1120–21; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 16 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
303 See GARDNER, supra note 76, at 30.
304 See Re Rose, Rose v. IRC [1952] 1 Ch 499 at 500 (Eng.).
305 Thus, in Milroy v. Lord (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 264 at 274 (Eng.), A’s attempt to transfer shares to B failed because the regulations of the company
provided that such transfers could only be effectuated through compliance with
certain formalities, and A had instead attempted to transfer shares by executing a deed poll. See Re Rose [1952] 1 Ch at 508–09.
306 See Re Rose [1952] 1 Ch at 512–13.
307 See Doggett, supra note 298, at 264.
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C. Inward-Looking Safeguards
Agreement-based constructive trusts safeguard A’s autonomy because they do not arise whenever A informally declares a
trust. As discussed earlier, formality requirements protect settlor
autonomy by ensuring the decisiveness of decisions.308 However,
if B is party to the informal agreement, having made a relevant
promise upon which A relies in the requisite way, then an
agreement-based constructive trust is justified because it strikes
a balance between both A’s and B’s autonomy.309 This explains
why, where A informally declares herself trustee for another, no
balancing act is called for, and therefore, without more,310 the need
to protect settlor autonomy prescribes that a constructive trust will
not arise to compel A to carry out the informally declared trust.311
Re Rose constructive trusts, on the other hand, provide
two inward-looking safeguards.312 The first is found in the rule
that a constructive trust will not arise if A “expressly or impliedly
by inaction [had] manifested an intention to retain or reacquire
the property free of trust”313 in the event the legal title fails to
be transferred to B. This ensures that A is not coerced into accepting a legal consequence against her own choice.314
The second safeguard is found in the fact that a constructive trust will not arise simply because A intends to make an
immediate transfer of property to B: it is necessary further for A to
have “taken all the steps that would be required of [A] personally
in order to implement the transfer in the intended manner.”315
Of course, where A’s intention is manifested in such a way that
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 24(3)–(4) (AM. L. INST. 2001).
310 According to section 24(4) and illustration 18 of that subsection of the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, a constructive trust will arise if A becomes
incompetent, dies or commits an act of part performance, or if B relies on A’s
declaration before A repudiates the informal declaration of trust.
311 Penner, supra note 78, at 496.
312 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 16 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
313 Id. For an example, see Smith v. Charles Bldg. Serv. Ltd [2006] EWCA
(Civ) 14 [4]–[5] (Eng.), where A signed stock transfer form but did not date it,
and handed it to B in the course of business negotiations. No constructive
trust arose, because “[b]usinessmen tend to leave dates in such documents
blank where they do not intend them to have immediate effect.” Smith v.
Charles Bldg. Serv. Ltd [2005] EWHC (Ch) 654 ( [69] (Eng.).
314 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 16 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
315 Id.
308
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it can be enforced as an express trust, then that will be the result;
but otherwise the law would unduly encroach into A’s autonomy
if she were forced to hold her property on trust for B in the absence
of an enforceable express manifestation of intention and without
any other indication of a decisive decision to dispose of her property.316 Therefore, A will only be taken to have conclusively intended to transfer the property to B where A’s (non-express)
intention to do so is coupled with actions that are consistent with
such an intention.317 This safeguards A’s autonomy.318
D. Outward-Looking Safeguards
An outward-looking safeguard for agreement-based constructive trusts is found in the requirement for B to have made a
promise upon which A had relied.319 The law would obviously
fail to protect B’s autonomy as legal title holder if B were compelled to hold the property for A despite not having chosen to do so
prior to acquiring the property.320 The rule that a constructive trust
does not arise in relation to informal self-declared trusts also provides an outward-looking safeguard, by ensuring that successors to
A’s property are not bound to carry out the purported trust, except where an express trust was properly created.321 Otherwise,
to compel a successor to carry out A’s informally self-declared
trust where the successor was not party to any agreement with A
would be an intrusion on the successor’s personal autonomy.322
In relation to Re Rose constructive trusts, certainly it is
A’s autonomy that is primarily secured because these constructive trusts may arise even though B has no knowledge of the
intended transfer.323 However, they also safeguard B’s autonomy
See Re Rose, Rose v. IRC [1952] 1 Ch 499, at 510–11 (Eng.).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 16 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
318 Id.
319 See id.; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing outwardlooking safeguards).
320 See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 627, 632 (noting
how constructive trusts are imposed coercively in contrast with the typically
consensual relationship of the express trust).
321 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 24 cmt. (3)–(4) (AM. L. INST. 2001).
322 See David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1675, 1699 (2009) (“[N]o one can be made to accept a trusteeship.”)
(internal quotation omitted).
323 Where there is reliance on the part of B, estoppel rules may become
relevant.
316
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through the objective manner in which the substance of A’s intention is ascertained.324 As discussed earlier, A must have acted
in an objectively ascertainable way, by doing everything in her
power to transfer the property to B.325 Should B come to learn of
A’s actions, B would objectively understand A to have conclusively
and irrevocably intended to effectuate a transfer of the property
to B.326 Re Rose constructive trusts therefore protect B’s autonomy by providing B with the freedom to order her life on the
basis of A’s objectively ascertainable intentions.327 This further
facilitates transactional efficacy.328 Thus, in the context of the
transfer of shares in a private company, it has been said that
where a member [gives] a transferee a signed transfer form it
[is] rational and businesslike to say that the member had transferred the share to the transferee. Whether the transferee
was actually registered in the company’s books [is] no longer
the transferor’s business. The share [is] no longer the transferor’s in any meaningful business sense.329

E. External Limits
It is implicit in the discussion above that the constructive
trusts that we have discussed are subject to certain limits, external to the law of constructive trusts, but falling within trusts
law.330 The operation of agreement-based constructive trusts is
limited by the formality provisions governing express trusts; Re
Rose constructive trusts are limited by the rule that equity will
not assist a volunteer.331 These limitations remind us that these
constructive trusts do not operate in a vacuum, but within a complex framework that includes other (trusts-related) rules.332
Moreover, because those limiting rules themselves serve to protect personal autonomy, they also provide a warning that undue
expansion of the scope of these constructive trusts would be
See Re Rose, Rose v. IRC [1952] 1 Ch 499 at 512 (Eng.).
Id. at 500.
326 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 16 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Hurst v. Crampton Bros. (Coopers) Ltd. [2002] EWHC (Ch) 1375 (Eng.).
330 See supra text accompanying notes 319–29.
331 England: Milroy v. Lord (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 264; 45 ER 1185; America:
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 16 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
332 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 16 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
324
325
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counterproductive to the aim of enhancing autonomy.333 As Lord
Nottingham said in the well-known case of Cook v Fountain:
There is one good, general, and infallible rule ...; it is such a
general rule as never deceives; a general rule to which there is
no exception, and that is this; the law never implies, the Court
never presumes a trust, but in case of absolute necessity. The
reason of this rule is sacred; for if the Chancery do once take
liberty to construe a trust by implication of law, or to presume
a trust, unnecessarily, a way is opened to the Lord Chancellor to
construe or presume any man in England out of his estate; and
so at last every case in court will become casus pro amico.334

Finally, the operation of these constructive trusts would also
be subject to the external limits discussed above in relation to express trusts.335 For example, an informal agreement or a purported transfer of property pursuant to an illegal aim would not
be enforced.336
IV.RESULTING TRUSTS
A. Ground-Clearing
In Anglo-American law, it is generally recognized that B
holds property under a resulting trust for A’s benefit in three circumstances: where B is trustee of an express trust set up by A and
there is an incomplete disposal of the beneficial interest (failing
trusts, or “FT” cases); where A makes a voluntary transfer of property to B (voluntary transfer, or “VT” cases); and where A provides
money for the purchase of property vested in B (purchase money,
or “PM” cases).337 But American and English law ostensibly differ on two notable issues.338
333 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 83, at 1120–21 (noting that
mandatory rules of trust formalities are intent effectuating).
334 (1676) 3 Swan. 585 at 591–92 (Eng.).
335 See supra text accompanying notes 217–26.
336 Id.
337 See John Mee, The Past, Present, and Future of Resulting Trusts, in 70
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 189, 189 (2017).
338 Jamie Glister, Lifetime Wealth Transfers and the Equitable Presumptions of Resulting Trust and Gift, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1971, 1974–78 (2018).
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The first concerns the scope of presumptions. In England, VT
and PM cases give rise to a presumption of resulting trust in A’s
favor, subject to two situations that give rise to a presumption of
a gift in B’s favor, namely: where A and B are in a specified relationship339 which raises the presumption of advancement, and
where there is a voluntary transfer of an interest in land.340 It
remains unclear whether FT cases engage any presumptions or
give rise to a resulting trust automatically upon the failure of an
express trust.341 In contrast, in America the presumption of resulting trust (except where the presumption of advancement applies) arises in FT342 and PM343 cases, but not in VT cases.344
The second concerns the rationale of resulting trusts. In
America, resulting trusts respond to negative intention, that is, the
fact “that [B] was not, in the circumstances that have occurred,
intended to have the beneficial interest.”345 Conversely, the English position is ambiguous.346 For example, in Westdeutsche, Lord
Browne-Wilkinson applied both a positive intention analysis—a
“resulting trust ... gives effect to [A’s] presumed intention” to create
a trust for herself347—and a negative intention analysis—“there is a
presumption that A did not intend to make a gift to B”348—as if they
were two sides of the same coin. They are demonstrably not: for
For example, where A is B’s father or stands in loco parentis to B, see,
for example, Hepworth v. Hepworth (1870) LR 11 Eq. 10 (Eng.); Shephard v.
Cartwright [1955] AC 431 (Eng.), or where A is B’s husband or fiancé, see, for
example, Tinker v. Tinker [1970] 1 All ER 540 (Eng.); Silver v. Silver [1958] 1
WLR 259 (Eng.). See, for a general discussion, Glister, supra note 338.
340 Law of Property Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 20, § 60(3); Hodgson v. Marks
[1971] Ch 892 at 933 (Eng.); Lohia v. Lohia [2001] WTLR (Civ) 101 (Eng.); Ali v.
Khan [2002] EWCA (Civ) 974 (Eng.); Crown Prosecution Service v. Malik [2003]
EWHC (Admin) 660. But cf. National Crime Agency v. Dong [2017] EWHC
(Ch) 3116 (Eng.).
341 The former view was expressed in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale
v. Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at 708 (Eng.); the latter view was expressed
in In re Vandervell’s Trusts (No. 2) [1974] 1 Ch 269 (CA).
342 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 8 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2001).
343 Id. § 9 cmt. a.
344 Id. § 9(2).
345 Id. § 7 cmt. a. However, this is not entirely free from controversy. See
generally HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 454, where it is asserted
that the law infers A intends to create a trust for herself.
346 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] AC at 708.
347 Id.; see also Swadling, Explaining, supra note 12; John Mee, Presumed
Resulting Trusts, Intention and Declaration, 73 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 86, 90 (2014).
348 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] AC at 708.
339
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example, each requires a different type of evidence to affirm, or
rebut, the presumption.349
It is instructive to begin with the rationale of resulting
trusts, as this affects our understanding of the relevant presumptions. There are three good reasons why the negative intention analysis explains, and ought to explain, resulting trusts
in English law.350
The first is that, as a matter of positive law, this view has
found much judicial support in the highest courts.351
Secondly, it avoids muddying the boundary between resulting trusts and express trusts.352 A resulting trust result can
be achieved not only where a presumption of resulting trust is
left unrebutted, but also where there is positive evidence that
either affirms the presumption of resulting trust, in cases where
that presumption operates,353 or rebuts the presumption of gift.354
On the positive intention analysis, resulting trusts respond to
A’s (presumed or actual) positive intention to create a trust for
herself; therefore, if actual evidence of that positive intention is
available, it would simultaneously give rise to an express trust and
a resulting trust (except where that positive intention cannot be
enforced as an express trust, for example due to informality).355
349 See Hodgson v. Marks [1971] Ch 892 at 896–97 (Eng.) (discussing what
evidence of notice is needed to establish positive intent to create trust being
more than mere gifting words that confer beneficial interest).
350 For other reasons, see LIEW, RATIONALISING, supra note 112, at 4–10.
351 See, e.g., Air Jamaica Ltd. v. Charlton [1999] 1 WLR 1399 at 1412 (Eng.);
Lavelle v. Lavelle [2004] EWCA (Civ) 223 [13]–[14] (Eng.) (on appeal taken
from HC); Twinsectra v. Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 [92] (Eng.); Patel v. Mirza
(2016) 3 WLR 399 [238] (Eng.); see also P.J. Millett, Restitution and Constructive Trusts, 114 L. Q. REV. 399, 401 (1998) [hereinafter Millett, Restitution].
352 Millett, Restitution, supra note 351, at 400–03.
353 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Marks, [1971] Ch 892 at 933 (Eng.). There is sometimes
an unfortunate tendency to conflate the presumption with the underlying
resulting trust itself, such that the non-operation of a presumption is equated
to the non-arising of a resulting trust. See, e.g., UNDERHILL & HAYTON, supra note
203, ¶ 3.3 (“resulting trusts are imposed in such cases only if there is insufficient
evidence to ascertain the transferor’s intention.”); HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS,
supra note 12, § 453 (“changes in conveyancing methods render obsolete [VT
resulting trusts]”). Because a presumption of resulting trust can be affirmed
by positive evidence, as explained in the main text, the presumption of resulting trust is analytically distinguishable from the resulting trust itself.
354 See, e.g., Ali v. Khan [2002] EWCA (Civ) 974 [24] (Eng.).
355 See Millett, Restitution, supra note 351, at 401–02.
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This is clearly not the way the modern law works, as express and
resulting trusts are treated as distinct types of trusts.356 Conversely, a negative intention analysis properly distinguishes between them: actual (or presumed) evidence that B was not intended
to take the beneficial interest in the property gives rise to a resulting trust, while actual (and not presumed) evidence of A’s
intention to create a trust for herself (or for another party) potentially gives rise to an express trust.357 The two types of intention
may,358 or may not, overlap, but each type of trust is triggered
by a different type of intention.359
Thirdly, and most importantly, the negative intention
analysis avoids obscuring the autonomy-enhancing features of
express trusts.360 The earlier-mentioned potential overlap between express and resulting trusts that follows from the positive
intention analysis suggests that A may reap the benefits of the
facilitative device of the express trust without engaging fully
and meaningfully with that device, since the simple fact that A
has voluntarily transferred property to B or has paid for property
that is purchased in B’s name may, without more, provide A the
benefit of a presumed resulting (express) trust.361 This poses a
problem for autonomy-based liberalism because it fails to distinguish between trusts arising as a result of A’s successful utilization of the express trust facility, and trusts arising in response
to an absence of an enforceable intention.362 Moreover, the overlap between express and resulting trusts significantly reduces
the scope of operation and justification of the statutory formality
requirements for express trusts, which, as discussed earlier,
serve to protect settlor autonomy.363
Once we accept the negative intention analysis, the differences in the scope of presumptions are easily explicable: in both
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 7 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001).
See id. § 1 cmt. e.
358 In relation to which, see infra Section VI.A.
359 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 7 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001).
360 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 83, at 1120–21.
361 Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. §§ 7–8 (AM. L. INST. 2001); supra
note 256 and accompanying text.
362 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 83, at 1120–21; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRS. §§ 7–8 (AM. L. INST. 2001); supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
363 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 83, at 1120–21; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRS. §§ 7–8 (AM. L. INST. 2001).
356
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America and England, the presumption of resulting trust applies
except in categories of cases where the facts indicate that it is
highly likely that A would have intended for B to take the beneficial interest in the property.364 This neatly explains FT cases:
A, as settlor of the express trust, is unlikely to have intended to
benefit B, who is a trustee, with any undisposed beneficial interest
under an express trust; hence, the presumption of resulting trust
applies.365 It also explains PM cases, where it is no more reasonable to believe that A intended B to take the beneficial ownership
than that A wished to retain it; hence, the presumption of resulting
trust applies.366 The presumption of advancement is also explicable on the same basis: the presumption of gift applies where
“[B] and [A] have a relationship that makes it probable that the
[A] intends to make a gift to [B].”367 That presumption can be
rebutted by evidence that A did not intend for B to take the beneficial interest in the property.368
What about VT cases? The apparent divergence between
American and English law boils down simply to a difference in
view as to whether a voluntary transfer is likely to indicate that A
intended for B to take the beneficial interest in the property.369
In America, the law thinks that it does: “changes in conveyancing
methods” and “present day social and business customs” support
the likelihood that a voluntary transfer of any property is highly
likely to be accompanied by an intention that the recipient should
take the beneficial interest in the property.370 Conversely, English
courts have only gone so far as to accept those reasons in relation
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 8 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2001).
If any undisposed beneficial interest can be dealt with in accordance
with A’s express intention, for example a reversionary provision or an intention
to abandon any undisposed interest in the property such that it vests in the
Crown as bona vacantia, then that intention forms part of the express trust,
and the trust does not ‘fail’ in the first place. See id.; see also Westdeutsche
Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at 708 (Eng.).
366 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 9 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001).
367 Id. § 9 cmt. b. There are other competing rationales, however, see JAMIE
GLISTER & JAMES LEE, HANBURY & MARTIN: MODERN EQUITY [11-027] (21st
ed. 2018); Jamie Glister, Is There a Presumption of Advancement?, 33 SYDNEY
L. REV. 39, 39–40 (2011).
368 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 9 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
369 See Glister, supra note 338, at 401–02.
370 HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 453.
364
365
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to conveyances of land,371 which explains why the presumption
of resulting trust does not apply only to voluntary transfers in
that context.
The negative intention analysis might trigger a further
question: does this analysis necessarily entail that resulting trusts
are simply a response to (the event of) unjust enrichment? If so,
then unjust enrichment claims would (or ought to) ordinarily lead
to a trust remedy,372 as is presently thought to be the case in
America (although under the label of constructive trusts).373
This is not the case in England.374 On a proper understanding,
the answer to the question must be in the negative.375 As is the
case with express trusts, the ascertainment of A’s (lack of) intention is objectively determined at the time B acquires the relevant
property; and the objectivity of the exercise means that whether
A is adjudged to have (lacked) the relevant intention is an exercise
to be undertaken against a background of pre-existing (objective) legal rules.376 One of those background legal rules concerns
the law of unjust enrichment.377 For example, whether A objectively lacks the intention to give B the beneficial interest in the
property where A mistakenly transfers property to B is not an
answer dictated as a matter of analytical logic.378 That question
See, e.g., Lohia v. Lohia [2001] WTLR 101, [22] (Eng.) (discussing § 60(3)
of the Law of Property Act 1925 (“[A] voluntary conveyance means what it
says; it is not necessary to use additional words to make it effective .... the
suspicion with which gifts of land were formerly viewed, which was at least
one of the underlying reasons for the presumption, would no longer have been
regarded as material.”)).
372 See ROBERT CHAMBERS, RESULTING TRUSTS 108–09 (1997); PETER BIRKS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 100 (rev. ed. 1989).
373 See HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 453.
374 While in England there is indeed a growing trend of categorizing trusts
responding to unjust enrichment as resulting trusts, GOFF & JONES, supra
note 235, ¶ 38-46 and cases cited therein, unjust enrichment does not give
rise to a proprietary trust response as a matter of course.
375 See P.J. Millett, Review Article: Resulting Trusts, 6 RESTITUTION L. REV.
283, 285 (1998) [hereinafter Millett, Resulting Trusts] (reviewing CHAMBERS,
supra note 372) (discussing other ways that resulting trusts arise that are
different from an instance of unjust enrichment).
376 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 9 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001),
with id. § 7 cmt. a.
377 See Millett, Resulting Trusts, supra note 375, at 285.
378 Thus, for example, Lord Millett has suggested, applying an objective
approach to intention, that a mistaken transfer “[does] not affect [A’s] intention
371
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poses a distinct and separate question of law best left to a discussion of the aims, justifications, and policies underpinning the
law of unjust enrichment.379
B. The Role of Resulting Trusts in Enhancing Autonomy
Resulting trusts enhance autonomy by ensuring that an
owner “does not lose his property unless he himself intentionally
[and successfully] gives it away.”380 Thus, in England, a resulting
trust has been called “a default trust,”381 which arises unless A can
be shown to have reached a decisive and enforceable decision to
dispose of her property. In America, resulting trusts have been
described as arising only as “a last resort,”382 which similarly
indicates that a resulting trust will arise if A does not intend to
dispose of her property.383 In both jurisdictions, resulting trusts
act as the last bastion of personal autonomy, returning property
to its owner in the absence of a decisive dispositive decision.384
In doing so, resulting trusts simultaneously guard property
owners against being coerced into relinquishing ownership where
they have not decisively chosen to do so and secure their ability to
determine for themselves how their property will be dealt with.385
That is, they facilitate property owners’ pursuit of “self-chosen
goals and relationships,”386 by “allow[ing] [them] to have private
authority over [their] resources.”387 Therefore, owners are protected in a multitude of circumstances, for example, where there
is actual evidence that A did not intend to give away her property;
that the money should become the property of [B].” Millett, Restitution, supra
note 351, at 412; see also Millett, Resulting Trusts, supra note 375, at 283, 285;
Twinsectra v. Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 [91] (Eng.); Challinor v. Juliet Bellis &
Co. [2015] EWCA (Civ 59) [103]–[04] (Eng.).
379 See Millett, Resulting Trusts, supra note 375, at 285.
380 GARDNER, supra note 76, at 32 (stating how an “owner’s property” is
read loosely to include PM cases, where the property which is paid for by A
and put in B’s name is considered to be “A’s property”).
381 Twinsectra, [2002] 2 AC [100], [102].
382 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. §§ 7 cmt. a, 9 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2001).
383 See id. § 7 cmt. a.
384 Id. § 9 cmt. e.
385 See id. § 8 cmt. a (discussing how when transfer through resulting trust
fails, ownership is retained).
386 RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 370.
387 Dagan, supra note 62, at 178.
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where A attempts but fails properly to dispose of her property;
where there is no evidence as to A’s intention concerning the
beneficial interest in her property (as where a presumption of
resulting trust remains unrebutted); and even where A was in
fact undecided on the fate of the beneficial interest in the relevant
property.388 A resulting trust arises in A’s favor so long as A had
not decisively decided to dispose of her property.389
The autonomy-enhancing role of resulting trusts is reflected in the fact that they are “reversionary in nature”390: they
provide the mechanical remedy of invariably returning to A the
beneficial interest that A does not intend B to have.391 Returning
the property to A is precisely what is needed to protect A’s autonomy where an enforceable decisive decision to dispose of the
property is absent.392 This can be contrasted with express and
constructive trusts, which enhance personal autonomy by giving
effect to positive choices, which is why, unlike resulting trusts,
they do not return beneficial interests, but compel the beneficial
interest under property to be held according to the party’s, or
parties’, positive intentions.393
Finally, the law of resulting trusts remains autonomyenhancing even where the presumption of gift applies.394 Because
the starting points of both the presumption of resulting trust and
the presumption of gift are diametrically opposed,395 it might be
tempting to conclude that the former secures autonomy better
than the latter. This view is mistaken. If we accept that the presumption of gift corresponds to the likelihood, within a category
of case, that A intends to give the beneficial interest to B, then
switching from the presumption of resulting trust to a presumption of gift in categories of cases where A is more likely to have
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 8 cmts. c(1), h (AM. L. INST. 2001).
See cf. id. § 8 cmt. f (discussing when presumption of resulting trust
can be overcome showing decisive action by transferor (A)).
390 Id. § 7 cmt. a.
391 See id.
392 See Millett, Resulting Trusts, supra note 375, at 401.
393 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 7 cmts. a, d (AM. L. INST. 2001).
394 See id. § 9 cmt. c.
395 For example, in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington LBC
[1996] AC 669 at 708 (Eng.), Lord Browne-Wilkinson described the presumption of advancement as a “counter-presumption” vis-à-vis the presumption of
resulting trust.
388
389
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had such an intention is a strategy designed precisely to protect
A’s autonomy.396
C. Inward-Looking Safeguards
Resulting trusts secure property owners’ autonomy in a
negative sense: the property is held on resulting trust for A if
there is no good reason to hold the contrary.397 Put positively,
then, the fact that resulting trusts always yield to A’s enforceable, decisive positive manifestations of intention provides an
inward-looking safeguard against excessive interference with
her personal autonomy.398
There are two ways in which A’s positive intention may
provide a contrary reason. Most obviously, an enforceable intention
to benefit B would negate the existence of a resulting trust,399 since
A as owner of the property is free expressly to make a gift to B.
But A may also manifest a positive intention, enforceable either as
an express trust400 (for A or a third party’s benefit) or as a contract,401 and a resulting trust will not arise.402 Allowing resulting
See Dagan, supra note 62, at 182.
As Robert Chambers observes, “[i]t is almost always preferable to give
effect to the parties’ intentions, but when that is impossible, the resulting trust
fulfils the ... function of ensuring that unintended benefits are returned.” Robert
Chambers, Is There a Presumption of Resulting Trust?, in CONSTRUCTIVE AND
RESULTING TRUSTS, supra note 109, at 286; see also Re Vandervell’s Trs. (No
2) [1974] Ch 269 [319] (Eng.); UNDERHILL & HAYTON, supra note 203, ¶ 22.13.
A similar point is made in Charles Rickett, The Classification of Trusts, 18
N.Z. U. L. REV. 305, 317–18 (1999).
398 See Rickett, supra note 397, at 318–19.
399 See e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 9 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2001);
see also id. § 8, illus. 1.
400 Id. § 7 cmt. a:
[I]f it is shown that the transferor manifested in proper form
an intention that the property or the interest in question is to
be held in trust wholly or partially for the transferor’s own
benefit, the provision creates an express trust or an expresstrust interest. Accordingly, ... there is no resulting trust.
Id.
401 This includes transferring property to discharge a prior obligation owed
to B, or making a loan such that the parties are in a simple debtor-creditor
relationship See id. § 9 cmt. e; Bennet v. Bennet (1879) 10 Ch D 474 at 474,
480–81 (Eng.). In these circumstances, A does intend B to take the beneficial
interest in the property.
402 Bennet, (1879) 10 Ch D at 480–81.
396
397
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trusts to override such enforceable positive intentions would have
the effect of overriding, rather than protecting, A’s autonomy.403
D. Outward-Looking Safeguards
Extensive as the law’s protection of A’s autonomy is, it
would be excessive to do so at the expense of protecting B’s autonomy.404 Thus, a resulting trust does not arise if there is good
reason for B to retain the beneficial interest in the property.405
This is why, in the typical resulting trust scenario, B is a mere
volunteer: as trustee (in the FT cases) or recipient of A’s property
(in the PM and VT cases), B does not normally provide any consideration in return for the acquisition of the interest vested in
her.406 But if B is not a volunteer, for example where B provides
“consideration for the transfer as an agreed exchange,”407 then a
resulting trust will not arise.408
Although there are no authorities directly on point, there
is no doubt that A’s intention is objectively ascertained, in line
with the general approach of trusts law.409 This approach also
provides an outward-looking safeguard: if A acts in such a way
that indicates to B an objective intention that B should take the
beneficial interest in the property, then a resulting trust ought
not to arise even though A may have a subjective intention not
to benefit B.410 After all, autonomy is relational, and A’s exercise
Compare id. at 480 (stating that the mother voluntarily accepted the
obligations associated with her choice), with Dagan, supra note 62, at 177–78
(discussing private law’s (property & contract) core of enhancing protection of
individuals’ choice of how to allocate, or benefit from, resources).
404 See HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 453 (discussing how
transferer’s reservation of interest at transferee’s (or trustee’s) expense is not
in line with modern society and notions).
405 Cf., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 7 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2001) (discussing the necessity of transferee (“b”) to have no remaining beneficial interest in property in order to form resulting trust).
406 See Millett, Restitution, supra note 351, at 414.
407 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 8 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2001). The lack of
consideration was a key reason why a resulting trust arose in Prest v. Petrodel
Resources Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34 [49] (Eng.).
408 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 8 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2001).
409 Rickett, supra note 397, at 311.
410 See id. at 318 (discussing benefits from analyzing the objective intent of
the parties).
403
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of autonomy ought not to be protected where it would unduly
intrude into B’s freedom to order her life on the basis of A’s objectively ascertainable intentions.411
E. External Limits
Until relatively recently, the English law of illegality provided a significant external limit on the operation of resulting
trusts.412 Where A put property in B’s name to achieve an unlawful purpose, whether A could recover the property under a
resulting trust depended on whether it was necessary for A “to
plead or rely on the illegality.”413 Essentially, this meant that the
outcome would be dictated by whether the presumption of resulting
trust or advancement applied: if the former, then A would succeed
due to the presumption working in A’s favor without A having to
rely on any tainted evidence; if the latter, then B would succeed
since A would be unable to adduce the tainted evidence to rebut
the presumption.414 This approach, which skewed resulting trust
rules in an arbitrary manner, created the risk of curbing the
autonomy-protecting function of resulting trusts without careful
consideration of the merits of doing so.415 Since 2017, however,
that arbitrary approach has been jettisoned in favor of a more
nuanced approach, where the outcome would depend on whether
“it would be contrary to the public interest to enforce a claim if
to do so would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system.”416
This brings English law in line with most of American law, where a
See Dagan, supra note 62, at 190–91.
See Tinsley v. Milligan [1944] 1 AC (HL) 340 at 375 (Eng.).
413 Id. at 340.
414 See id. at 344.
415 See id. at 345–46.
416 Patel v. Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 at [120]:
In assessing whether the public interest would be harmed in
that way, it is necessary a) to consider the underlying purpose of
the prohibition which has been transgressed and whether that
purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim, b) to consider
any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim
may have an impact and c) to consider whether denial of the claim
would be a proportionate response to the illegality, bearing in
mind that punishment is a matter for the criminal courts.
411
412

Id.
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similarly nuanced approach is taken.417 When properly applied,
the element of illegality would limit A’s autonomy by denying
her the benefit of a resulting trust, but only where this outcome
is justified, all things considered.418
In New York, however, the law has taken a different
course. Since 1830, resulting trusts no longer arise in PM cases
except in limited circumstances.419 One of the main reasons for
this was put thusly in the notes to the New York Revised Statutes of 1830: “[w]hy should a man purchasing lands for his own
benefit, take the conveyance in the name of another? Can his
motives be other than fraudulent? Or if this secret mode of acquiring title be permitted, is it not to purposes of fraud, that will
be abused?”420 The upshot is that A’s autonomy is curbed in PM
cases, ostensibly due to illegality and public policy concerns.421
It is submitted that such an approach is undesirable. Certainly, illegality and public policy ought to trump autonomy concerns where justified; however, the state’s commitment to protecting
personal autonomy ought to mean that A’s autonomy is protected
and enhanced unless there is some valid reason to hold the contrary.422 Certainly, a category of case exhibiting similar features
which provide a valid contrary reason may justify withholding
resulting trusts in cases falling within that category.423 However,
an institutionally cynical view of A’s motives in entering into a
particular type of transaction surely does not itself provide a valid
contrary reason.424 In the absence of a valid reason for abolishing resulting trusts,425 over-protectionism unjustifiably intrudes
into A’s autonomy.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. §§ 8 cmt. i, 9 cmt. g (AM. LAW
INST. 2001).
418 See id.
419 The New York Revised Statutes of 1830, § 52, now consolidated in the
New York Consolidated Laws, Estates, Powers & Trusts Law § 7-1.3(a).
420 See HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 467.
421 See HARDING, supra note 1, at 52.
422 See id. at 64.
423 See id.
424 See Bryan, supra note 69, at 383.
425 Indian law provides an example of what might provide a valid reason.
Indian customary law contains the device of the “benami”, which is a traditional
“system of acquiring and holding property and even of carrying on business in
names other than those of the real owners.” Gur Narayan v. Sheolal Singh,
417
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V.DEFENDING THE JUSTIFICATION
The discussion so far has sought to demonstrate that trusts
law is justified because it enhances personal autonomy in a unique
way, with express, (some) constructive, and resulting trusts each
having a crucial role to play in doing so. In this section, that
justification is defended against two arguments that might be
raised against it. The first is that trusts law cannot be justified
without identifying the ultimate value (or values) that it allows
property owners to engage with.426 The second is that trusts law
cannot be justified in view of the morally reprehensible ends to
which express trusts are commonly put in practice.427
A. Ultimate Value(s)
Some might argue that the availability of trusts law can
only truly be justified once the ultimate value(s) that it allows
engagement with is (or are) identified.428 Otherwise, the argument goes, why ought the state commit resources to maintaining
and developing trusts law, rather than enhancing personal autonomy through some other means (or, indeed, none at all)?429
After all, the argument continues, the liberal state is required
only to ensure that the range of options available to individuals
is adequate, rather than maximized; therefore, what really justifies the freedom to engage with the trust?430
(1918) 5 AIR 140 (India). Functionally, “benami” transactions are indistinguishable from resulting trusts: as the Privy Council held, the benami would be
recognized as a resulting trust. Id. at 145. Resulting trusts were made available in India by virtue of §§ 81 and 82 in the Indian Trusts Act 1882. However,
the high usage of “benami” transactions significantly contributed to the Indian
black money problem. This led to the abolishment both of the “benami” transaction and of resulting trusts in India. Benami Transactions Prohibition Act,
§ 7 (1988).
426 See infra Section V.A.
427 See infra Section V.B.
428 Cf. DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 157, at 1–2, 5.
429 Cf. id. at 6 (“[C]hoice theory shows why a state committed to human
freedom must actively enable people’s relationships by shaping distinct contract types.”).
430 Cf. id. (“[C]hoice theory shows that liberal states are affirmatively obligated to ensure an adequate range of contract types.”) (emphasis added).
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Let me attempt an answer—a tentative one, but one informed by the discussion in this Article. The search for an ultimate
value or values is futile, not because there are none, but because
of the plethora of values which trusts law allows engagement
with; and, therefore, the true value of trusts law—that is, its
justification—lies in its facilitation and enhancement of individuals’ autonomy to engage with one or more ultimate value of
their choosing.
It is first useful to observe that attempts to justify trusts
law by way of one or more ultimate values are unable to account
for trusts law comprehensively. Consider the following four justifications, gleaned from the literature: first, that trusts are essentially “contractarian”—“a deal, a bargain about how the trust
assets are to be managed and distributed”;431 second, that trusts
are “a derivative form of property” that “extends property’s coordination function”;432 third, that trusts “[allow] those who could not,
or would not, be owners to have access to the ownership institution,” that is, those to whom “ownership [is] either categorically
unavailable or ... substantially costly”;433 fourth, that the trusts
are characterized by the norm of fiduciary stewardship of assets.434
Each of these might provide a part-justification, but in each case
it is easy to see how trusts law enables individuals to do much more
than those justifications allow for.435 Thus, the “contractarian” view
cannot account for self-declarations of trust; the “property coordination” justification cannot account for cases where the trustee is
one of the primary beneficiaries and is able personally to benefit
from the trust property; the “ownership” justification cannot account
Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 627.
MING-WAI LAU, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRUSTS LAW 181 (2011).
That coordination function consists of exclusion and governance strategies,
which Lau argues are embodied in the trust because it offers “governancebased exclusion,” that is, duties imposed on the trustee to exclude her from
the benefits of the trust property. Id. at 164.
433 Avihay Dorfman, On Trust and Transubstantiation: Mitigating the Excesses of Ownership, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW
350 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).
434 Charles Mitchell, Stewardship of Property and Liability to Account, 78
CONV. & PROP. LAW. 215 (2014).
435 It must be emphasized that this is not a criticism levied against those
authors, who do not claim that their justifications are all-encompassing. The
point is simply that the major justifications that have been propounded are
not capable of being all-encompassing.
431
432
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for bare trusts where the beneficiary was the initial owner of the
trust property; and the “fiduciary” explanation cannot account for
cases where ouster or exemption clauses effectively preclude all
or most of a trustee’s fiduciary duties.436 Moreover, these justifications only purport to explain express trusts; they say nothing
about constructive and resulting trusts.437
One response to the lack of success in identifying trusts
law’s ultimate value may be to search harder; but perhaps there
is no one ultimate value or set of values that provides a justification for trusts law.438 A hint in this direction can be seen in the
express trust’s immense flexibility, which allows it to be tailored
to suit a multitude of purposes, thereby allowing settlors to engage
with any among the plethora of ultimate values.439 For example,
a complex trust of a long duration would engage the “fiduciary”
and “property coordination” features of trusts; a trust arising out
of a contractual relationship would be susceptible to the “contractarian” analysis; and a trust set up for infants or vulnerable
individuals may be explained on the basis of access to the ownership institution.440 Each trust is different because property owners
See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 658.
See id. at 641.
438 Cf. NICHOLAS MCBRIDE, THE HUMANITY OF PRIVATE LAW: PART I: EXPLANATION 175 (2018) (where express trusts are said to have the aim of “enhancing
the RP-flourishing of those who create them”). “RP” indicates a particular vision of
human flourishing found in modern Western liberal societies, one that McBride
unpacks in Chapter 3. Crucially for present purposes, McBride argues that
varying “forms” of the good life are not mutually incompatible, as liberals
often assume, but that each form represents “part of a bigger picture”—that
of the RP. Id. at 108–14. The RP is therefore presented as a “meta-ultimate
value” of sorts. There is scope to question whether McBride’s argument withstands scrutiny on its own terms. See, e.g., Joaquín Reyes, The Humanity of
Private Law. Part I: Explanation, 10 JURIS. 597 (2019); Yan Kai Zhou, Book
Review, MOD. L. REV. (2020) (advanced access: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230
.12519 [https://perma.cc/S6DZ-5W38]). But, even if we accept its validity, the RP
is too wide and non-specific as a value-level justification for express trusts.
Property owners can utilize express trusts to achieve one or a number of values as
desired, according to the circumstances, and this important feature of express
trusts is best brought out by recognizing that the enhancement of personal
autonomy lies at the heart of express trusts, rather than by reference to an allencompassing meta-ultimate value.
439 See GARDNER, supra note 76.
440 See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 5, at 625; Dorfman, supra
note 433.
436
437

2021] JUSTIFYING ANGLO-AMERICAN TRUSTS LAW

747

are free to use the express trust device to achieve that which they
desire, depending on the circumstances.441
If this is right, then we might say that trusts law is justified not because it allows engagement with any particular ultimate
value (or a defined set of values), but because it allows engagement with any or any combination of ultimate values in ways
that cannot be replicated (or replicated as readily) using other
facilitative devices such as contracts, wills, and property.442 That
is to say, without trusts law, the law would provide property owners
with (in Razian terms) an inadequate range of options, because
the multitude of aims that trusts law allows property owners to
achieve could not otherwise be so pervasively and easily realized.443 Therefore, trusts law’s justification lies in the fact that it
significantly enhances property owners’ autonomy.444
This conclusion brings to mind JE Penner’s important paper
“Untheory of the Law of Trusts.”445 In that paper, Penner suggests
that there is no theory of trusts law.446 By “theory” he means that
which, through debates or disagreements, aims to reveal “core
principles, which can be elaborated in different contexts to justify
the particular rules of law,”447 those core principles of which also
“reveal the moral or economic or other ‘commitments’” of an area
of law.448 One of the main reasons he gives for his “untheory”
view is that trusts law is “essentially facilitative”: it “is not here to
tell us what morality requires us to do or not do.”449 Therefore:
Understood as a legal device of this kind, it should not be surprising that one almost never encounters legal disagreement as
to its core rules or principles, for as an artificial, facilitative
construct of this kind, to dispute the core rules or principles
would be to dispute the existence of the device itself. It is
nothing but its core rules and principles.450

See GARDNER, supra note 76.
See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 373.
443 See id. at 413.
444 See Penner, supra note 6, at 657.
445 See id. at 653.
446 See id. at 654.
447 Id. at 655.
448 Id. at 656.
449 Id. at 665.
450 Id. at 666. Elsewhere, Penner suggests that the “core principles” of
trusts law—for example, that beneficiaries have beneficial interests that bind
441
442
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The argument in this Article finds much common ground
with Penner: both argue that trusts law is not organized around
ultimate values that it allows property owners to achieve, but
operates at the “second-order,”451 “derivative”452 level, facilitating
property owners’ autonomy to engage with whatever ultimate value
or values they so desire.453 But there is one significant point of
departure. The argument in this Article presents the enhancement of personal autonomy as the justification—the “theory”—of
trusts law. And it seems clear that it is capable of being understood as such, contrary to Penner’s argument, because it can shed
light on the moral commitments of trusts law, and that there can
be deep and meaningful debates and disagreements about it.454
The clearest example relates to constructive and resulting trusts.455
Do they evince a commitment to facilitating personal autonomy,
as argued in this Article, or does their “theory” lie somewhere else,
a view towards which Penner himself might perhaps be inclined?456
Therein lies a “theoretical” disagreement, properly so-called.457
But, even in relation to express trusts, with which Penner is exclusively concerned in his paper, the enhancement of personal
autonomy can supply the underlying “theory.”458 Thus, although
it may not be disputed that the express trust is facilitative in
nature, there are outstanding questions over (for example) the
extent to which it enhances autonomy differently from other
areas of private law, the extent to which it ought to do so, and
third parties, that trustees must keep property separate and must account to
beneficiaries, and that trusts are not contracts—are themselves “the central
organizing rules.” Id. at 664–65.
451 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 1 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2001).
452 See id. § 7 cmt. d.
453 See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 373.
454 See Penner, supra note 6, at 656.
455 See id. at 666.
456 For example, Penner has written of Rochefoucauld, one of the agreementbased constructive trusts cases, that the trust arises because B (rather than
A) as “settlor of the trust” had affected a self-declaration of trust, contrary to
the analysis in this Article. J.E. PENNER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS ¶ 6.12 (10th ed.
2016). He has also suggested, contrary to the analysis in this Article, that
constructive trusts may allow the law to “impose the result most justified in
the circumstances—in some cases the constructive trust should be a bare trust for
A ... in others it should ... [carry] out A’s intention.” Id.
457 See id.
458 See id.

2021] JUSTIFYING ANGLO-AMERICAN TRUSTS LAW

749

the limits and necessary safeguards of settlor autonomy.459 The
answers to these questions will influence how we understand
existing rules and how courts develop the law. And the answers
to these questions can only be found and refined through debates and disagreements about the theory of express trusts.
B. Ultimate Ends
It is a well-rehearsed criticism levied against the express
trust that it allows property owners to achieve morally contentious
aims such as tax avoidance and assets protection—the shielding
of assets against those who may have a legitimate claim against
them, for example, creditors, ex-spouses, and the like.460 In view
of this criticism, it might be argued that the justification propounded in this Article—the enhancement of personal autonomy—
is the very thing that makes express trusts unjustified.461 The
argument is that this leads to an “autonomy overkill” of sorts,
since it sanctions the utilization of the express trust device to
achieve those morally contentious ultimate ends.462
Those concerns may well be valid. However, I suggest that
those ultimate ends do not make trusts law unjustified; or, to put
the same point differently, it is unnecessary for a justification of
trusts law to take into account the ends towards which express
trusts may be put in practice. This is because, as a facilitative
body of law, express trusts are ill-suited to deal with the question of
ultimate ends. This point can be made by observing the difficulty
the law would face in developing internal trusts law rules or approaches to address those undesirable ultimate ends without
eroding the autonomy that the express trust provides to others
who wish to utilize them for other non-controversial aims.463
See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 373.
See HARDING, supra note 1, at 74.
461 See Mark Bennett & Adam Hofri-Winogradow, Against Subversion: A
Contribution to the Normative Theory of Trust Law 4 (Hebrew University of
Jerusalem Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 20-25), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3579955 [https://perma.cc/3DK7-UCAB].
462 See Penner, supra note 6, at 655.
463 Bennett and Hofri-Winogradow seem to argue the same, where they
write that:
Trusts should exist, but external legal regimes should step in
to prevent their subversion, by way of a rule-based closing of
459
460
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Consider three ways in which trusts law might offer internal solutions to the tax avoidance and asset protection problems: first, by requiring a compulsory trusts register; second, by
rendering invalid trusts that avoid (as opposed to evade) tax or
that are set up primarily for asset protection purposes; third, by
allowing only state-regulated institutions or licensed individuals
to act as trustees. Although these efforts may well reduce the instances of tax avoidance or asset protection, they have an overreaching effect. Thus, a trust register might curb a property owner’s
autonomy to informally enlist another to achieve her goals; vetting trusts according to their purposes risks invalidating trusts
where a morally contentious (but not illegal) aim is simply an
unintended side effect of a settlor’s primary purpose, not to mention the difficulties courts would face in ascertaining settlors’
(subjective) intentions; and regulating trustees would drastically
confine the use of express trusts only to those who have substantial wealth and can afford to engage those approved trustees.
In short, it would be self-defeating for trusts law to provide
solutions, because it risks eroding settlors’ autonomy that express
trusts set out to facilitate in the first place.464 A better approach,
which is generally speaking the law’s present strategy, is to recognize properly established trusts as valid and enforceable, but to
leave the heavy lifting to other areas of law such as tax law, insolvency law, family law, and so on.465 Those areas of law are better
loopholes or a general anti-subversion standard. It might be
said that this is preferable to a closed list of permitted trust types,
because none of the autonomy provided by the trust is thereby
taken away.
See Bennett & Hofri-Winogradow, supra note 461, at 37–38. But earlier in their
paper, they criticize existing trust law theory for not attempting to justify the
subversive use of trusts. See id. at 4. In their concluding section they suggest
that “trust law should ... be developed ... to control [subversion].” Id. at 40. These
latter points are inconsistent with the former.
464 See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 373.
465 See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 509 F. App’x 765, 767 (10th Cir.
2013) (discussing conviction for tax evasion involving the use of trusts); Abusive
tax shelters, trusts, conservation easements make IRS’ 2019 “Dirty Dozen” list
of tax scams to avoid, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses
-self-employed/abusive-trust-tax-evasion-schemes-talking-points [https://perma
.cc/6QSZ-CRDD].
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able to provide a targeted response without eroding the autonomy
provided for by trusts law.466
Of course, the argument is not that trusts law should be
made available at any cost. For example, if there is empirical evidence that express trusts are overwhelmingly used to sanction
illegal (as opposed to morally opprobrious) acts, or if the empirical
evidence indicates that the costs of creating targeted regulatory
measures are unduly burdensome, then there might be an argument for doing away with trusts law.467 However, the fact that
trusts law plays the crucial role of enhancing personal autonomy
in a unique way sets a very high threshold for such drastic action—one which Anglo-American law has not (and may never)
come close to breaching.468
VI.REFLECTIONS
The conclusion that trusts law enhances personal autonomy in a unique way helps to advance our understanding of the law
in a number of important respects, three of which are reflected
upon in this section.
A. Hierarchy of Trusts
It is implicit in the earlier discussion that there is value
in identifying whether a trust is an express, constructive, or resulting trust.469 This taxonomical approach towards trusts law, while
sometimes derided as a “bewildering ... preoccupation,”470 is of
But see Bennett & Hofri-Winogradow, supra note 461, at 40 (“[T]rust law
should not be developed to facilitate the subversion use, but to control it.”).
467 See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1349, 1389 (2011) (“To be empirically informed, regulations should be
revisited and reviewed retrospectively, to ensure that they are promoting
their intended functions, and are not producing excessive costs or unintended
adverse side effects.”).
468 See id.; see also John H. Langbein, Trust Law As Regulatory Law: The
Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1342 (2007) (“[T]he purpose of trust law is to give maximum effect to the wishes of the transferor—that is, to private autonomy.”).
469 See supra Section I.B.
470 Paul Finn, Common Law Divergences, 37 MELB. U. L. REV. 509, 513
n.24 (2013).
466
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fundamental importance in view of the autonomy-enhancing
function of trusts law: the type of trust enforced reflects the particular autonomy-based reason for the trust, which justifies its
enforcement.471 As Bogert reminds us, “it will be helpful if the
history and theory of each is kept clearly in mind and the same
name is applied to the same concept or transaction throughout.”472
The point can be taken further by asking: what is the appropriate hierarchy of trusts? The need to determine the hierarchy of trusts obviously arises only where there is a choice to be
made. Take the simple case where, after securing B’s agreement
to hold A’s shares on trust for A, A properly declares a trust to
that effect and transfers the shares to B. The trust might be
categorized as an express trust, since no formality requirements
are necessary because the property is not land; but, it might also
be categorized as a constructive or resulting trust, the former on
the basis of A’s reliance on B’s promise, and the latter on the
basis that this is a VT case and A does not intend for B to take
the beneficial interest.473 Instinctively, one would say that this
is an express trust474: but, the precise reason for this warrants
explanation. From an autonomy point of view, the answer is
straightforward: an express trust categorization indicates that
A, as a property owner, has the freedom to and successfully utilizes the trust device in dealing unilaterally with her own property.475 A property owner’s autonomy finds its greatest meaning
when the law recognizes that she is free to do so even without
first securing a counterparty (B)’s agreement (which is required
for an agreement-based constructive trust); and the commitment to
enhancing personal autonomy entails that any positive indication
RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 375.
HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 451.
473 Id.
474 This is confirmed, for example, in The Restatement (Third) of Trusts:
Where one person pays the purchase price and directs that the
property be transferred to a natural object of the payor’s bounty,
the rule of this subsection does not apply if the payor properly
manifests an intention to create an express trust for one or
more third parties. A resulting trust does not arise in favor of
the payor, nor can the transferee keep the property free of trust,
for there is instead an express trust for the third person.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 9 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2001).
475 See id.; see also HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, §§ 41, 43.
471
472
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of intention is directly recognized as the source of the trust, rather
than simply giving recognition to what A did not intend (that is,
negative intention, to which resulting trusts respond).476
What about the relative hierarchy between constructive
and resulting trusts? For example, suppose A and B reach an
informal agreement that B will hold A’s land on trust for A: the
trust cannot be an express trust due to the informality of the
agreement, but there are the elements of promise and reliance
necessary for a constructive trust, and a negative intention necessary for a resulting trust.477 It might be thought that the categorization in this case does not matter because both trusts are
precluded from the statutory formality requirements by section
8 of the Statute of Frauds; but this is mistaken from an autonomy
point of view.478 The fact that B made a promise upon which A
relied ought to be recognized as the reason for which the arrangement is enforced, since this gives due regard to A’s and B’s freedom to engage one another on the path to realizing their respective
goals.479 A resulting trust analysis, conversely, would underemphasize the law’s commitment to enhancing autonomy, since merely
giving effect to A’s negative intention would under-represent and
overlook the parties’ positive exercise of autonomy.480
Does this hierarchy also apply where an informal agreement
provides that B will hold land on trust for C? Here, a difference
in categorization may lead to a different outcome: a constructive
trust is capable of compelling B to hold for C, while the effect of
a resulting trust is simply the return of the land to A.481 The
position taken in the R3T482 is that, unless A has become incompetent or has died, the appropriate response is to return the
See supra Section III.B (discussing agreement-based constructive trusts);
supra note 355 and accompanying text (discussing positive intention and resulting trusts); supra notes 360–63 and accompanying text (discussing positive
and negative intention analysis and autonomy).
477 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. §§ 2 cmt. e, 7 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2001).
478 See id. § 7 cmt. d; see also supra text accompanying notes 473–74.
479 See supra text accompanying notes 287–92.
480 See supra text accompanying notes 345–63.
481 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 24(3) cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2001); see
supra notes 278–80 and accompanying text.
482 Id.
476
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property to A,483 because “[i]t prevents unjust enrichment and yet
gives force to the statute of frauds by not enforcing a trust that
fails to satisfy the statutory requirement.”484 In England, these
reasons are also often cited for the view that the property ought
to be returned to A,485 although a relatively recent Court of Appeal case has gone the other way and held that a constructive
trust arises in C’s favor.486 Some American states have even
taken the statute of frauds argument further, holding that no trust
arises and B may retain the property free from any trust.487
It is clear, however, that a constructive trust outcome is
not prevented by the black letter of the statute of frauds: “the
Statute also allows trusts to be implied which indicates that the
legislatures did not intend to provide that all relief on real property trust theories must be dependent on the existence of written evidence. The Statute expressly permits constructive trusts
to be proved by oral evidence.”488 From an autonomy perspective, the reason for this is that the purpose of formalities is to
protect settlors’ unilateral exercise of autonomy to create trusts;
they do not prevent property owners enlisting others (even informally) in order to achieve their goals.489 Once the statute of
frauds concern is overcome, it becomes clear that a constructive
trust for C’s benefit is the appropriate outcome.490 As we have
seen, trusts law is committed to enhancing autonomy by giving
legal effect to decisive decisions.491 Provided that B’s promise to
hold on trust for C is clearly expressed, A’s reliance on B’s promise indicates the requisite decisive decision to divest herself of
the property in C’s favor.492 Enhancing A’s personal autonomy in
the circumstances, therefore, requires that A’s decision is fully
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts categorizes such a trust as a “constructive trust,” but the argument made in the main text applies equally to
the question of whether B ought to hold the property for A’s or C’s benefit. Id.
484 Id.
485 See discussion in LIEW, RATIONALISING, supra note 112, at 73–74.
486 De Bruyne v. De Bruyne [2010] EWCA (Civ) 519 (Eng.).
487 HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 495.
488 Id. § 497.
489 Id.
490 Id.
491 See supra Section I.B.
492 See supra text accompanying notes 289–92.
483
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respected; doing any less detracts from the commitment to enhancing A’s autonomy.493 The desire to reverse any so-called
unjust enrichment, even if a valid aim, does not take precedence
over the protection of A’s autonomy provided for by constructive
trusts in these circumstances.494
B. Trusts Law Within Private Law
In the introductory section of this Article it was noted that,
at least on one view, trusts law is an “optional extra” within a legal
system: it does not provide a minimum form of protection for
persons, property, or promises.495 In the light of the autonomyenhancing justification of trusts law, it is useful now to revisit that
point: is trusts law really a necessary component of private law?
In the first place, the discussion in this Article indicates
that this question is posed too widely.496 Resting alongside the
facilitative devices of contracts, wills, and property rules is not
trusts law as such, but more specifically express trusts.497 To compare those devices with constructive and resulting trusts is to
compare apples with oranges, because constructive and resulting
trusts are not devices intended to be utilized by individuals to
secure their desired goals or ends; rather, they are devices used
by the state (that is, courts) to secure the personal autonomy of
its citizens.498 Certainly, nothing prevents enlightened individuals from intentionally tailoring their actions in such a way to
“ensure” a constructive or resulting trust outcome.499 However,
it remains a fact that they do not function to protect property
owners’ autonomy to set up a facilitative trust device.500 Therefore, the aims and functions of constructive and resulting trusts
cannot be replicated or reduced to any single or combination of
other facilitative devices available in the law.501 Crucially, this
indicates that it is necessary for any liberal state committed to
See supra Section I.B.
See HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 495.
495 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
496 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
497 See id.
498 See supra text accompanying notes 50–52.
499 See id.
500 See Penner, supra note 6, at 267.
501 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 1 (AM. L. INST. 2001).
493
494
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enhancing personal autonomy to have devices similar to agreement-based constructive trusts, Re Rose constructive trusts, and
resulting trusts in order to protect property owners’ relational
autonomy and to allow them to take decisive decisions for themselves concerning their own property.502
What about express trusts? Dagan, in writing about private law generally, argues that private law is justified in vesting
on individuals’ normative powers “because [they] are ... crucial
to their self-determination.”503 He applies this statement to property
and contracts law, suggesting that “they are particularly valuable
conventions” that “any humanist polity must enact.”504 The same,
of course, cannot be said of express trusts: many civilian jurisdictions do not recognize any form of trusts law, but it cannot be
denied that they are a “humanist polity.”505
However, as we have seen, from an autonomy perspective
the facility of the express trust is not justified on the basis of the
uniqueness of its rules and outcomes, that is, on the ground that
they cannot fully be replicated by other facilitative devices (although this much is true), but on the basis that it provides additional options for owners to deal with their property.506 After all,
the liberal state’s duty is to facilitate the conditions of autonomy,
one of which is the provision of an adequate range of options; it
is not to take a partial view as between different morally good and
incompatible rules and outcomes.507 If this is correct, then the
availability of express trusts indicates that the criterion for justifying private law does not lie in how crucial to self-determination
a particular rule or area of law is.508 Rather, private law is justified if the options it provides enhance autonomy by securing the
conditions of autonomy (including the provision of an adequate
range of options), and if, when the available options are engaged, the rules (governing the rights, duties, powers, remedies,
etc.) reflect a “reciprocal respect for self-determination.”509
See id.; Dagan, supra note 62, at 181.
Dagan, supra note 62, at 180 (emphasis added).
504 Id.
505 Id.
506 RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 369.
507 See id.
508 Dagan, supra note 62, at 180.
509 Id. at 6.
502
503
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From a wider perspective, then, the fact that trusts law
exists is significant evidence that private law is not satisfied
merely with securing personal independence in a negative, minimal, or disengaged sense; rather, it is committed proactively to
enhancing the scope for individuals to self-determine as partauthors of their own lives. Private law does not leave interpersonal interactions between private individuals to the forces of
nature, but actively facilitates their flourishing.510
C. A Question of Degree
It is well-known that modern trusts law was historically a
product of English law.511 Indeed, the trust was famously lauded
by F.W. Maitland as being “the greatest and most distinctive
achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence.”512 It is unsurprising, therefore, that trusts law has made
its way into the legal systems of jurisdictions which have adopted
(either wholly or partly) the common law system.513 But, the influence of trusts law goes further: an increasing number of civilian
legal systems are making available the express trust through statutory activism,514 including those that might not be described as
reflecting a liberal ethos (at least in the Western sense).515 If we
take a step back and look at the state of trusts law globally, it is
observable that the applicable trusts law rules differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.516 Some of those differences are significant:
See Hanoch Dagan, The Challenges of Private Law: A Research Agenda
for an Autonomy-Based Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY
67 (Kit Barker et al. eds., 2017).
511 See Finn, supra note 470, at 509.
512 FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, The Unincorporate Body, in THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF FREDERIC W. MAITLAND 272 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911).
513 See generally MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2000).
514 On this topic, see generally id.; THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST (David Hayton
3d ed., 2011); RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW (Lionel Smith
ed., 2012) [hereinafter RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST]; TRUST LAW IN ASIAN CIVIL
LAW JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Lusina Ho & Rebecca Lee
eds., 2013).
515 A stark example is the provision of trusts law in China PRC: see the
Chinese Trust Law 2001.
516 See RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST, supra note 514, at 1.
510
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for example, certain (mostly civilian) jurisdictions do not recognize constructive or resulting trusts,517 regulate the class of individuals allowed to act as trustees, or require registration of
certain trusts on a public register in order for trusts to be enforceable against third parties.518 Other differences are relatively
more subtle: for example, jurisdictions may differ as to the recognition of noncharitable purpose trusts or bare trusts.519 Given
these differences, it might be asked whether the argument in this
Article—that trusts law enhances autonomy—is also capable of explaining trusts law more globally.
It seems clear that the answer is in the affirmative. So long
as any legal system makes available express trusts (of whatever
form), it actively facilitates property owners’ exercise of autonomy
by allowing them additional options as to how they deal with
their own property, and to that extent its trusts law is autonomy-enhancing.520 But, it is also important to remember that the
extent to which personal autonomy is enhanced is inherently a
question of degree, and, therefore, the differences that exist in
relation to specific trusts law rules reflect the different extents to
which these jurisdictions are committed to enhancing personal
autonomy, all things considered.521
Regardless of those differences, once it is explicitly recognized that trusts law is inherently autonomy-enhancing,522 then
this provides each jurisdiction with a structured approach for
engaging in debates and discussions concerning the development
of their laws. Rather than dealing with each trust law rule (or
each group of rules) solely on its (or their) own terms, a more holistic
approach can be taken: it would first be necessary to determine
the extent or degree to which the state is committed to enhancing personal autonomy, before assessing trust law rules in the
light of the answer to that question.
517 See generally Ying-Chieh Wu, Constructive Trusts in the Civil Law Tradition, 12 J. EQUITY 319 (2018).
518 See RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST, supra note 514, at 2.
519 See id.
520 See supra Section II.A.
521 See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 373.
522 See Gardbaum, supra note 29, at 401.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, trusts law can be justified on the basis that
it is comprehensively autonomy-enhancing.523 Its availability
demonstrates that the state is committed to securing and enhancing personal autonomy via different perspectives: through
the provision of a facility for property owners to unilaterally deal
with their own property (express trusts), through allowing individuals the freedom to enlist others in their pursuit of their
goals (agreement-based constructive trusts), and through ensuring that only conclusive choices have long-lasting legal effects (Re
Rose constructive trusts and resulting trusts).524 The enforcement of
trusts law rules represents a justified form of coercion: “if the
government has a duty to promote the autonomy of people the
harm principle allows it to use coercion both in order to stop
people from actions which would diminish people’s autonomy
and in order to force them to take actions which are required to
improve peoples’ options and opportunities.”525 That coercion is
confined only to situations that justifiably call for it: thus, trusts
law contains specific rules that act as inward-looking and outward-looking safeguards, ensuring legal consequences flow only
where they are called for.
In the same way that autonomy is not the ultimate value
within a liberal political morality but interacts intricately with
other liberal values, so does trusts law not operate within a vacuum but against a background of various legal and non-legal
norms and rules.526 Therefore, concerns external to trusts law
may legitimately impose limits on the autonomy-enhancing function of trusts law. However, those limits ought properly to be
justified in order to prevent them from unduly encroaching into
the autonomy of individuals.

Id.
See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
525 RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 27, at 416.
526 See id. at 370.
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